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Articles 
SMOKEY AND THE BANDIT IN 
CYBERSPACE: THE DORMANT 
COMMERCE CLAUSE, THE TWENTY-FIRST 
AMENDMENT, AND STATE REGULATION 
OF INTERNET ALCOHOL SALES 
Brannon P. Denning* 
Recently, some federal judges have given oenophiles eve-
rywhere reason to rejoice by striking down, under the dormant 
Commerce Clause doctrine, venerable state laws that limit the 
import and sale of alcoholic beverages to customers directly. 1 
Such laws had presented a considerable obstacle to the sale of 
Assistant Professor, Southern Illinois University Colh:ge of Law. LL.M., Yah: 
Law School, 1999. J.D., The University of Tennessee, Knoxville, 1995. B.A., The Uni-
versity of the South, 1992. Thanks to Jennifer Gill and Jennifer Daulby for excellent re-
search assistance. Boris Bittkcr, Jacob Cogan, Jack Goldsmith, Pat Kelley, and Gh:nn 
Reynolds provided helpful suggestions and comments on earlier drafts. 
I. Sec, e.g., Swedenburg v. Kelly, 2!X)(] WL 1264285 (S.D.N.Y.) (Sept. 5, 2UOO) (re-
fusing to dismiss dormant Commerce Clause challenge to New York direct shipment and 
advertising ban); Dickerson v. Bailey, 87 F. Supp. 2d 691 (S.D. Tex. 2000) (striking Texas 
personal importation statute on dormant Commerce Clause doctrine grounds); Briden-
braugh v. O'Bannon, 78 F. Supp. 2d 828 (N.D. Ind. 1999), rcv'd sub nom., Bridenbaugh v. 
Freeman-Wilson, 2000 WL 1286249 (7th Cir. 2000). The most recent opinion in the New 
York litigation, Swedenburg v. Kelly, 2002 WL 31521023 (S.D.N.Y. 2(XJ2), summarized 
the recent decisions, which arc in some disarray. 
Owing to the unusual length of time between the writing of this article and its publi-
cation, I was unable to discuss the most recent decisions discussing the dormant Com-
merce Clause doctrine and the Twenty-first Amendment in detail. In addition to the 
Swedenburg decision mentioned above, sec Bainbridge v. Turner, 311 F. 3d 1104 (11th 
Cir. 2002); Dickerson v. Bailey, 212 F. Supp. 2d 673 (S.D. Tex. 2002); Beskind v. Easley, 
197 F. Supp. 2d 464 (W.D.N.C. 2002); Bolick v. Roberts, 199 F. Supp. 2d 397 (E.D. Va. 
2002); Glazer's Wholesale Drug Co., Inc. v. Kansas, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1234 (D. Kan. 2<Xll). 
I have tried to remedy this with brief discussions of the most recent decisions in the foot-
notes accompanying my discussion of earlier lower court cases. Sec Part IV. I thank the 
editors for allowing me to update my article during the editing process. 
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alcohol, wines in particular, over the Internet.2 For the most 
part, only parents concerned about sales to minors and in-state 
liquor distributors have voiced concern. Many commentators 
approve of federal court application of the dormant Commerce 
Clause doctrine-the long-standing guarantee that parochial 
barriers will not be allowed to inhibit the free-flow of goods 
throughout our national market-to invalidate these laws.3 
But one might ask, glancing at a copy of the Constitution, 
what of the Twenty-first Amendment?4 Section Two of that 
amendment, after all, reads: "The transportation or importation 
into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for 
delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the 
laws thereof, is hereby prohibited. "5 The plain text of that sec-
tion suggests that these recent court decisions are mistaken.6 
2. Sec, e.g., Uncorking a Wine Industry Controversy, Nat'l J. 472 (Feb. 12, 2000) 
("Thirty states prohibit the direct sale by producer to consumer."); R.W. Apple, Zinfan-
del by Mail? Well, Yes and No, N.Y. Times F1 (May 19, 1999). Most states have some 
form of a ''three-tier" liquor distribution system in place. As a Michigan court succinctly 
explained, under such a syst~m. "consumers must purchase alcoholic beverages from li-
censed retailers; retailers must purchase them from licensed wholesalers; and wholesalers 
must purchase them from licensed manufacturers." Heald v. Engler, (No. CIU.A. 00-
CV-71438) 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24825 at *3 (E.D. Mich.) (Sept. 28, 2!Xll). Under 
som.: states' laws, in-state producers arc exempt from the common prohibition on direct 
shipment to consumers. 
3. Sec, e.g., Vijay Shanker, Note, Alcoholic Direct Shipment Laws, the Commerce 
Clause, and the Twenty-first Amendment, 85 Va. L. Rev. 353, 354 (1999) (arguing that 
laws should be sustained only when they further the "core" purpose of the Twenty-first 
Amendment, which is temperance); sec also Duncan Baird Douglass, Note, Constitu-
tional Crossroads: Reconciling the Twenty-first Amendment and the Commerce Clause to 
Evaluate State Regulation oj Interstate Commerce in Alcoholic Beverages, 49 Duke L.J. 
1619, 1653-59 (2!XJO) (describing the debate over whether Congress should regulate 
Internet alcohol sales to ensure validity of state laws to prevent underage drinking, as 
well as allegations that such laws simply prop up state distributors and wholesalers); 
"Cyber-bootlegging" Just Rhetoric for Protectionism, Houston Chron., (May 2, 2()(Xl), 
available at 2()()0 WL 4295786. 
4. Sec U.S. Const., Amend. XXI. Ratified in 1933, the Twenty-first Amendment 
contained three sections; only section two is of major importance to my article. The first 
section merely repealed the Eighteenth Amendment, which inaugurated national prohi-
bition. Sec id. § l. Section three imposed a seven year time limit on ratification. Sec id. 
o. 
5. !d. s 2. 
6. Laurence Tribe has correctly pointed out that the Twenty-first Amendment 
docs not actually empower the states to control the liquor trade, but rather curiously 
makes the violation of a state's liquor laws unconstitutional. Laurence H. Tribe, How to 
Violate the Constitution Without Even Trying: Lessons from the Repeal of Prohibition to 
the Balanced Budget Amendment, in William N. Eskridge and Sanford Levinson, eds., 
Constitwional Stupidities, Constitutional Tragedies 99 (New York U. Press, 1998). He 
acknowledges elsewhere, however, that "interpreting § 2, in accord with its apparent 
purposes, as authorizing states to regulate the importation of liquor in certain ways that, 
without the Twenty-first Amendment, would violate the Commerce Clause is surely the 
best way to read the provision so that it makes practical sense .... " Laurence H. Tribe, 1 
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Yet the courts tell us that the Twenty-first Amendment is not to 
be read literally or invoked as a shield for protectionist legisla-
tion. Only laws designed to promote "temperance," they say, 
are protected by the Amendment from dormant Commerce 
Clause scrutiny.7 
Where did the district courts get the idea for this distinc-
tion-between "good" alcohol legislation, which furthers the 
state's legitimate "core" interest in temperance, and is protected 
under the Twenty-first Amendment, and "bad" legislation moti-
vated by simple economic protectionism and thus constitution-
ally impermissible? Certainly not from the text of the Amend-
ment, whose wording makes no such distinction. Not from the 
Framers of the Twenty-first Amendment, whom the recent court 
decisions barely discuss. 8 Not from Congress, which recently 
opened the federal courts to state attorneys general to enforce 
state legislation against out-of-state alcohol shippers.9 Rather, it 
is the Supreme Court, in a series of decisions beginning over 
thirty years ago, that has constrained the operation of the 
Amendment to such a degree that it has become an '"almost' 
forgotten clause of the Constitution." 10 Yet, shortly after the 
Amendment's ratification, when the Court was first called upon 
to interpret it, no less a gray eminence than Mr. Justice Brandeis 
turned aside a number of challenges to allegedly protectionist 
state liquor legislation, arguing that to make the distinctions 
made by recent lower courts, would be to effect not a "construc-
tion" of the Amendment, but a "rewriting" of it. 11 
To put it plainly, recent lower court decisions have indulged 
in broad applications of the Supreme Court's own narrow inter-
pretations of the Twenty-first Amendment-fashioned in cases 
whose facts went beyond the explicit text of the Amendment-
American ConslilLl/ional Law§ 1-12, at 36 n.15 (Foundation Press, 3rd ed., 20<Xl). 
7. Sec, e.g., Bridenbaugh, 78 F. Supp. 2d at 831-32; Shanker, 85 Va. L. Rev. at 383 
(cited in note 3) ("'There is only one reason to distinguish alcohol from other commodi-
ties in terms of federal power over interstate commerce: the state's interest in promoting 
temperance."). 
8. Sec Part IV. 
9. Sec, e.g., S. 577, 106th Cong., 2d Scss. (March 2, 2000) (providing for federal 
injunctive relief to state attorneys general to stop the importation or transportation of 
liquor into or through their state in violation of state law); Douglass, 49 Duke L.J. at 
1653-59 (cited in note 3) (describing debate over the so-called "Twenty-first Amendment 
Enforcement Act"). 
I 0. Duckwonh v. Arkansas, 314 U.S. 390, 399 (1941) (Jackson, J., concurring). Jus-
tice Jackson was expressing his displeasure at his brethren for making inroads on the 
power of the states granted to them under his reading of the Amendment. 
II. Sec notes 55-56 and accompanying text. 
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and have erroneously concluded that those decisions dictate the 
invalidation of state liquor importation laws. That courts con-
tinue to construe narrowly-nearly to the vanishing point-a 
specific reservation of state power at federalism's high tide of ju-
dicial enforceability, seems particularly worthy of attention. The 
growing market for interstate shipment of alcohol, and the near 
unanimity of federal courts in their continued assertions of the 
Twenty-first Amendment's irrelevance, makes this an appropri-
ate time for a reexamination of the Amendment and the Su-
preme Court's interpretation of it. 
In this essay, I will do three things. First, I will summarize 
the history of the framing and ratification of the Twenty-first 
Amendment. Its purposes were well understood to go beyond 
merely allowing states to pursue temperance policies. At the 
time, the question was understood to be whether the states or 
the federal government would control the liquor trade. Second, 
I will chart the evolution of the Supreme Court's Twenty-first 
Amendment jurisprudence and describe the Court's move from 
rules to standards in applying the Amendment. The adoption of 
the more flexible approach, I will show, has resulted in a dra-
matic reduction of state power over alcohol. Finally, I will cri-
tique the district court decisions that limit states in the one area 
in which their power remained largely unquestioned by the Su-
preme Court-the regulation of liquor imports from out-of-state. 
If these recent decisions are affirmed, the result will be the func-
tional repeal of the Twenty-first Amendment. In hopes of avert-
ing this, I offer suggestions to lower courts and to the Supreme 
Court for applying the Amendment in future cases. 
I. FEDERAL REGULATION OF ALCOHOL 
BEFORE PROHIBITION 
States began to regulate the sale of alcohol in the nineteenth 
century, sometimes prohibiting it altogether, under their police 
power. 12 Many states exempted "personal users" from their liq-
uor laws, which tended to restrict only wholesalers and retailers. 
12. The Court upheld such regulations, even though they involved some regulation 
of interstate commerce in The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847). The Court, 
however. did not offer a consistent rationale, rather delivering its opinion in what Carl 
Swisher termed "a riot of diversity." Carl Brent Swisher, 5 The History of the Supreme 
Court of the United States: The Taney Period 375 (MacMillan, 1971 ). For the information 
here, and that which follows in this section, I have freely drawn on Boris I. Bittker's, 
Bittker on the Regulation of Interstate and Foreign Commerce~~ 9.02, 13.01-13.04, 13.06 
(Aspen Law & Business, 1999). 
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But when states attempted to expand their laws and prohibit im-
portation of out-of-state liquor for in-state delivery, the Supreme 
Court struck down the import bans as direct regulations of inter-
state commerce. 13 "The absence of any law of Congress on the 
subject is equivalent to its declaration that commerce in that 
matter shall be free," held the Court in Leisy v. Hardin. 14 
Alarmed, states pressed Congress for permission to freely regu-
late alcohol. Congress responded with the Wilson Act of 1890, 15 
which gave states the right to regulate liquor the moment it ar-
rived in the state "to the same extent and in the same manner as 
though such ... liquor had been produced" there, regardless 
whether such liquor was in its "original package" or not. 16 A 
year later, In re Rahrer17 blessed this "reconveyance" of regula-
tory power by Congress to the states. Through the exercise of its 
commerce power, the Court reasoned, Congress was free to "di-
vest" an article of commerce of its interstate characteristics. 18 
Despite the Wilson Act, the Court later struck down more 
state laws restricting the importation of liquor for personal use, 
again prompting congressional action. In 1898, the Court invali-
13. Sec, e.g., Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890) (invalidating an Iowa law restrict-
ing local manufacture, importation, and sale of liquor, as applied to Illinois beer seized in 
Iowa); Bowman v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 125 U.S. 465 (1888) (invalidating an Iowa law 
prohibiting railroads from importing liquor unless accompanied by a certificate that con-
signee was licensed to sell liquor). Sec Richard F. Hamm, Shaping the Eighteenth 
Amendment 56 (U. North Carolina Press, 1995) ("The U.S. Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of the federal interstate commerce power shaped the course of the prohibition 
movement. . [T]he brewers, after failing to establish a Fourteenth Amendment right to 
make liquor, turned to the federal commerce power to curtail the effects of state prohibi-
tion."). Hamm writes that "[w]ithin a month of [Leisy], 'original package houses' and 
'supreme court saloons' had sprung up in every prohibition state." !d. at 69. According 
to Hamm, Bowman "became a powerful wedge for them to usc to force their wares into 
dry states. Liquor in transit could not be legally seized nor could it be stopped at the 
state ·s borders." !d. at 66. 
14. Leisy, 135 U.S. at 119. Sec Hamm, Shaping the Eighteenth Amendment at 56-57 
(cited in note 13) (cases like Bowman and Leisy "define[ d) the limits of state action over 
liquor so as to insure freedom of commerce within the nation and protect the federal 
government's power to regulate commerce"; at the same time, they "created a national 
crisis over liquor control and prompted Congress to act."). 
15. 26 Stat. 313 (1890). Sec Hamm, Shaping the Eighteenth Amendment at 57 (cited 
in note 13) ("The Supreme Court's interstate commerce decisions created an 'original 
package business' that threatened all liquor controls and created a crisis in alcohol pol-
icy" resulting in the passage of the Wilson Act, which inaugurated "a system of concur-
rent state and federal jurisdiction over liquor."). 
16. 26 Stat. 313 (1890). The reference to the "original package" was necessary be-
cause of Chief Justice Marshall's decision in Brown v. Maryland that goods were immune 
from state taxation so long as they were in their original packages. The doctrine, now 
discarded, was expanded by subsequent courts, and was an important part of the Court's 
early dormant Commerce Clause doctrine jurisprudence. 
17. 140 U.S. 545 (1891 ). 
18. ld. at 562. 
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dated a South Carolina law that prohibited the shipment of liq-
uor into the state, as applied to consignment shipments to indi-
viduals for personal use. 19 Cong,ress eventually responded with 
the Webb-Kenyon Act of 1913,2 which prohibited the "shipment 
or transportation, in any manner or by any means whatsoever" 
of liquor "from one State, Territory, or District of the United 
States" into another "in violation of any law" of the State, Terri-
tory, or District. 21 The Court upheld the Webb-Kenyon Act in 
Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Railway Co., relying in 
part on the assertion in In Re Rahrer that Congress could "di-
vest" commodities of their interstate character, so as to permit 
state regulation otherwise forbidden by the dormant Commerce 
Clause doctrine. 22 
Two years after Clark Distilling Co., the Eighteenth 
Amendment was ratified, and nationwide prohibition became 
the law of the land.23 Proposed in part as a sop to "drys" around 
19. Vance v. W.A. Vandercook Co., 170 U.S. 438 (1898); sec also Rhodes v. Iowa, 
170 U.S. 412 (1898) (holding that goods "arrived" in a state only when delivered to the 
consigncc, effectively immunizing from state regulation liquor arriving by interstate car· 
rier). Alex Bickel commented that the Vandercook decision sanctioning mail-order liq· 
uor sales facilitated "the w..:tncss that the Webb-Kenyon Act was intended to sop up." 
Alexander M. Bickel and Bcnno C. Schmidt, Jr., 10 History of the Supreme Court of the 
United States: The Judiciary and Responsible Government, i910-21 at 440 (Macmillan, 
I 984); sec also Hamm, Shaping the Eighteenth Amendment at 176-77 (cited in note 13). 
Hamm notes that for seventeen years after Vandercook, "prohibitionists did not usc law 
to attack personal-usc shipments"; in turn "[s]hippers, liberated from state hindrance ... 
deluged the prohibition stales with intoxicating beverages, stimulating more court cases." 
!d. at 178. The decision "created a nourishing interstate commerce in alcohol between 
wet and dry states. . . . Th..: ... express freight offices in prohibition territory often be-
came little more than interstate commerce liquor package stores." ld at 179. 
20. 37 Stat. 699 (1913). For more on the passage of the Wilson and Webb-Kenyon 
Acts, and the Court cases that upheld them, sec, for example, Hamm, Shaping the Eight· 
eemh Amendment at 81-90, 212-20 (cited in note 13). President Taft vetoed Webb-
Kenyon, which passed over his objections. Sec Bickel and Schmidt, History of the Su-
preme Court at 441-42 (cited in note 1 9). 
21. 37 Stat. 699 (1913). 
22. 242 U.S. 311,330 (1917). It did, however, suggest that such power might be re-
stricted to liquor, given "[t]he fact that regulations of liquor have been upheld in num-
berless instances which would have been repugnant to the great guarantees of the Consti-
tution but for thc enlarged right possessed by government to regulate liquor." ld. at 332 
(emphasis added). But sec Bittker, Regulation of interstate and Foreign Commerce at 9-
12 (cited in note 12) (footnote omitted) (suggesting absence of any principled rationale 
for confining congressional power to liquor; noting that "later cases have ruled that Con-
gress can consent to state regulations of interstate commerce in products with a more 
benign character than booze, such as insurance"). For an early assessment of Webb-
Kenyon's constitutionality, see Noel T. Dowling and F. Morse Hubbard, Divesting an 
Article of its interstate Character: An Examination of the Doctrine Underlying the Webb-
Kenyon Act (2 pts.), 5 Minn. L. Rev. 100, 253 (1921). On "reconveyance" of power by 
Congress to the states generally, sec Bittker, Regulation of Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce at** 9.01-9.06 (cited in note 12). 
23. For the story of Prohibition, sec Norman H. Clark, Deliver Us From Evil: An 
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the country and partly as a "war measure necessary for the sav-
ing of food and man power,"24 this social experiment soon ran 
into problems of widespread noncompliance, the rise of criminal 
rackets to satisfy the demand for alcohol, and the unwillingness 
of legislatures to appropriate_ resources for a real attempt to 
force nationwide compliance.2) It took the Great Depression, 
however, to effect the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment and 
bring an end to the "noble experiment"of Prohibition.26 
II. THE FRAMING AND RATIFICATION OF THE 
TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT 
The election of 1932 was a mandate for radical reform of 
America's experiment with prohibition; both the GOP and De-
mocratic Party platforms had called for its repeal. The Senate 
Judiciary Committee went to work; and by February, 1933, it re-
ported out Senate Joint Resolution 211, which would have re-
pealed prohibition, prohibited the importation of alcohol into 
states in violation of state law, and allowed for concurrent fed-
eral power "to regulate or prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquor 
to be drunk on the premises where sold"- a provision squarely 
aimed at ensuring that, no matter what, the Nation would be 
spared the return of the dreaded "saloon." It was this provision, 
then Section Three of the proposed Amendment, that proved to 
be the most controversial. The reasons for its eventual aban-
donment refute the notion that the Amendment was concerned 
only with promoting temperance or constitutionalizing the 
Webb-Kenyon Act.27 
Interpretation of American Prohibition (Norton, 1976); Hamm, Shaping the Eighteenth 
Amendment (cited in note 13); Richard Hofstadtcr, The Age of Reform 289-93 (Knopf, 
1955). 
24. John D. Hicks, Republican Ascendancy, 1921-1933 at 177 (Harper, 1960). Other 
historians similarly note the linkages between war mobilization and prohibition. Sec, 
e.g., Bickel and Schmidt, Hiswry of the Supreme Court at 531 (cited in note 19); Clark, 
Deliver Us From Evil at 128 (cited in note 23) (discussing the embrace of "the crusade for 
national and international purity" and noting that "as the country steadied itself for the 
great sacrifice, civilians were crusaders no less than servicemen, and conditions less than 
bone-dry became conditions less than patriotic"); Hofstadter, The Age of Reform at 291-
92 (cited in note 23). 
25. Hicks, Republican Ascendancy at 177-80, 261-62 (cited in note 24). 
26. I d. at 262 ("Just as the Eighteenth Amendment was the child of the First World 
War, so its repeal was the child of the Great Depression."); William Leuchtenburg, 
Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932-1940 at 9 (Harper & Row, 1963). Sec also 
Clark, Delh·er Us From Evil at 205 (cited in note 23) (noting that in the early part of the 
Depression, FOR emerged as ·'the symbol of liberalism, relief, and confidence. Repeal 
would go with relief, recovery, and reform"). 
27. A consistent claim among commentators who either objected to the Supreme 
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Two things are clear from the Senate debates on the pro-
posed amendment. First, supporters of Section Two intended 
the Amendment to return control over shipment and importa-
tion of alcohol to the states, and to insulate that state control 
from either congressional second-thoughts about the Webb-
Kenyon Act or a hostile Supreme Court decision striking down 
the Act.28 In other words, with regard to the importation of al-
Court's early interpretation of the Twenty-first Amendment or who approve of its more 
recent cases circumscribing state power is that the intent of Section Two was "merely" 
meant to constitutionalize the Webb-Kenyon Act, and that states ought not be allowed to 
exercise more power than that which the statute conveyed; or that it was merely passed 
to protect dry states. Sec. e.g., John H. Crabb, State Power Over Liquor Under the 
Twenty-first Amendment, 12 U. Del. L.J. 11, 13 (1948) (noting similarities between the 
second section of the Amendment and the Webb-Kenyon Act); Douglass, 49 Duke L.J. 
at 1632-33 (cited in note 3) (interpreting Senate debate on the Amendment to endorse 
''the limited purpose of allowing states to remain dry after the repeal of Prohibition."); 
Eric T. Freeman, Comment, The Twenty-first Amendment and the Commerce Clause: 
What Rationale Supports Bacchus Imports?, 13 Hastings Const. L.Q. 361, 374 & n.100 
(1986) (arguing that "several Senators supported Section Two" based on the understand-
ing that it did little more than give dry states the ability to resist importation of liquor); 
Shanker, 85 Va. L. Rev. at 375 (cited in note 3) ("Recent lower court cases have demon-
strated that temperance is the core purpose of the Twenty-first Amendment."); Ralph L. 
Wiser and Richard L. Arledge, Does the Repeal Amendment Empower a State to Erect 
Tariff Barriers and Disregard the Equal Protection Clause ir. Legislation on Intoxicating 
Liquors in Interstate Commerce?, 7 Gco. Wash. L. Rev. 402, 402, 407 (1939) ("The sec-
ond section of the Amendment generally was thought of as ... assurance that dry states 
would be protected from an influx of imported liquor" as opposed to "authorization for 
state tariff laws"; criticizing Supreme Court decisions giving a broader construction for 
"refusing to consider this background"); Note, Constitutional Law-State Control of Al-
coholic Beverages in Interstate Commerce, 27 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 127, 131 (1952) ("The prin-
cipal object of the Twenty-first Amendment was to permit each state to act as sole refe-
ree in the local battle between the 'wets' and the 'drys"' not to permit erection of trade 
barriers and "interfere with the free movement of alcoholic beverages"); Note, The 
Twenty-first Amendment ~'ersus the Interstate Commerce Clause, 55 Yale L.J. 815, 817 
(1946) (arguing that the Amendment merely constitutionalizcd Webb-Kenyon Act). 
There arc several problems with the analysis of the commentators who take this 
view. First, it cannot be denied that Section Two of the Amendment reads differently 
than docs the Webb-Kenyon Act. Second, the support they amass for the "constitution-
alization of Webb-Kenyon" thesis is meager-it often consists of one or two ambiguous 
remarks of Senators. Sec, e.g., Freeman, 13 Hastings Const. L.Q. at374 & n.100. Finally, 
most commentators fail to examine closely the debate surrounding the third section of 
the proposed amendment reported out by the Senate Judiciary Committee. The reasons 
senators expressed for opposing the concurrent exercise of enforcement power by the 
state and federal government sheds a good deal of light on the purpose behind Section 
Two, and on the question whether it was simply meant to insure that dry states would 
have their right to be dry guaranteed by the Constitution. Wet states, too, had an inter-
est in ensuring control over their own alcohol policies free from the specter of federal 
interference. Sec notes 33-51 and accompanying text. 
28. Sec, e.g., 75 Cong. Rec. 4141 (1933) (statement of Sen. Blaine) (speaking in fa-
vor of the Amendment "to assure the so-called dry States against the importation of in-
toxicating liquor into those States" and that it is necessary to insure agai~st a hostile de-
cision by the Supreme Court); id at4170 (statement of Sen. Borah) (noting that Section 
Two is necessary; otherwise "we arc turning the dry States over for protection to a law 
[i.e., the Webb-Kenyon Act] which is still of doubtful constitutionality and which, as it 
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cohol, the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine was to be inop-
erative. As S.J. 211's sponsor, Senator John J. Blaine, explained 
it: 
When our government was organized and the Constitution of 
the United States was adopted, the States surrendered control 
over and regulation of interstate commerce. This proposal is 
restoring to the States ... the right to regulate commerce re-
specting a single commodity-namely, intoxicating liquor. ... 
[Bjy reason of this provision, ~the State] in effect acquires 
powers that it has not at this time. -9 
Second, the section purporting to grant concurrent power to 
the states and the Federal Government to regulate the "saloon" 
was eliminated because of fears that it would invite congres-
sional encroachment onto the states' regulatory prerogatives 
that Section Two was supposed to secure.30 Even the Senate 
manager of S.J. 211, Senator Blaine, spoke at length in opposi-
tion to Section Three. In his "personal opinion," said Blaine, 
section 3 is ... contrary to section 2 of the resolution .... The 
purpose of section 2 is to restore to the States by constitu-
tional amendment absolute control in effect over interstate 
commerce affecting intoxicating liquors which enter the con-
fines of the States. . . . Thus, the States are granted larger 
power ... and are given greater protection, while under sec-
tion 3 the proposal is to take away from the States the powers 
that the States would have in the absence of the eighteenth 
amendment. My view ... is that section 3 is inconsistent with 
section 2, and that section 3 ought to be taken out of the reso-
lution.31 
was upheld by a divided court, might very well be held unconstitutional upon a re-
presentation of it"; and "we arc asking dry Stales to rely upon the Congress of the 
United Stales to maintain indefinitely the Webb-Kenyon law," possibly in the face of 
strong pressure to repeal); id. at 4172 (statment of Sen. Borah) ("Therefore, if we arc to 
have what we arc now promised, local self-government, State rights, the right of the peo-
ple of the respective Stales to adopt and enJOY their own policies, we must have ... some 
other provision of the Constitution, than those which existed prior to the adoption of the 
eighteenth amendment."). 
29. Id. at 4141 (statement of Sen. Blaine) (emphasis added). 
30. Sec, e.g., 75 Cong. Rec. at 4143 (statement of Sen. Wagner); id. (statement of 
Sen. Blaine); id. at4144-45 (statement of Sen. Wagner) (terming Section Three a "nullifi-
cation of the entire program of repeal"); id. at 4147 (statement of Sen. Wagner); id. at 
4177 (statement of Sen. Black) ("If this amendment should become part of the Constitu-
tion containing section 3, it would take away from the State the right the State now has to 
regulate or prohibit the sale of liquor. It would take it away by giving that power to 
Congress."). 
3 I. !d. at 4143 (statement of Sen. Blaine) (emphasis added). 
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Senator Hugo Black echoed Blaine's position. Were Section 
Three to become part of the Constitution, he argued, "it would 
take away from the state the right the State now has to regulate 
or prohibit the sale of liquor ... by giving that power to Con-
gress."32 
In addition, opponents of Section Three pointed out legal 
difficulties bound to arise from the language of the provision, 
which purported to give Congress concurrent power to regulate 
or prohibit the sale of liquor "to be drunk on the premises where 
sold. "33 What would become of state laws prohibiting consump-
tion of liquor where sold, if Congress chose to regulate, but not 
to prohibit the saloon? An early colloquy among Senators 
Blaine, Wagner and Shortridge illustrates the problem.34 Sena-
tor Blaine, explaining the position of the committee on Section 
Three, stated that in the absence of federal regulation of saloons, 
state laws "would be supreme."35 If Congress, on the other 
hand, "legislated upon that question . . . the States would 
have ... power to legislate along the same lines."36 When Sena-
tor Shortridge asked, "Which would be supreme,"37 Senator 
Blaine at first demurred, saying that was "a field in which we can 
get into all kinds of misunderstanding."38 Pressed by Senator 
Wagner, who asked whether state or federal law would prevail in 
the event of a conflict,39 Senator Blaine conceded that federal 
law would likely prevail.40 Senator WaRner thus concluded that 
"the word 'concurrent' is meaningless." 
Opponents of Section Three pointed out that since the pro-
posed amendment would give both the state and federal gov-
ernment equal power, it was not at all clear that ordinary pre-
emption rules applied. If they did, then the result was equally 
unacceptable, because it provided a backdoor for federal power, 
which could overwhelm state regulatory efforts. Senator Blaine 
pronounced Sections Two and Three "inconsistent" and "in-
compatible."42 Senator Wagner went further, alleging that Sec-
32. !d. at 4177 (statement of Sen. Black). 
33. Sec S.J. 211, * 3. 
34. 75 Cong. Rcc. 4143 (1933). 
35. !d. (statement of Sen. Blaine). 
36. !d. (statement of Sen. Blaine). 
3 7. !d. (statement of Sen. Shortridge). 
38. !d. (statement of Sen. Blaine). 
39. Id. (statement of Sen. Wagner). 
40. Sec id ("'In my opinion, Federal law would prevail ... as it docs under the 
eighteenth amendment.") (statement of Sen. Blaine). 
41. !d. (statement of Sen. Wagner). 
42. !d. (statement of Sen. Blaine). 
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tion Three effected a "nullification of the entire program of re-
peal."43 If Section Three remained, "we shall have two authori-
ties, Federal and State, simultaneously possessed of jurisdiction 
over the same area of regulation. The zone each is to occupy is 
undefined. "44 This would "unavoidably lead[] to confusion, con-
flict, and litigation," as well as domination of the states by fed-
eral authorities.45 Senator Brookhart claimed that the grant of 
equal power to state and federal governments meant that con-
flicting laws would both be constitutional, resulting in "a state of 
civil war between the State and the National Government."46 
Senator (later Justice) Black declared that "[b]oth the State and 
the Federal Government cannot have the power at the same 
time. The action of one of them will be the supreme law of the 
land, and the supreme law of the land of every State is the Con-
stitution of the United States. "47 Therefore, language about 
"concurrent" power notwithstanding, federal laws would prevail 
if there was a conflict. Then "the States of this Union will be 
helpless," concluded Black, because "they can not regulate the 
sale of liquor within their own boundaries, nor can they prohibit 
it."48 By one vote, senators' insistence on an unambiguous grant 
of power over liquor to the states overcame everyone's pro-
fessed horror at the prospect of the saloon's return, and Section 
Three was struck from S.J. 211.49 Following removal of Section 
Three, the Senate approved the measure 63-23. 
43. I d. at 4145 (statement of Sen. Wagner). 
44. ld. 
45. Jd. Later, Wagner confessed "that my imagination is not sufficiently fertile to 
foresee all of the extensions which will be grafted onto section 3 should it ever be incor-
porated into the Constitution." Id at 4147 (statement of Sen. Wagner). He noted that 
the grant of power to Congress in Section Three could be easily expanded by employing 
the Necessary and Proper Clause. Sec id. (statement of Sen. Wagner). New York Sena-
tor Robert F. Wagner was an ardent opponent of Prohibition. That he was concerned 
about the role the federal government would play in the future regulation of liquor at the 
state level belies the notion that Section Two was solely meant to protect dry states. 
Wets, too, worried that drys from the West and South could combine to again impose 
prohibition through the proposed Section Three. Sec, e.g., Outriglu Repeal Urged By 
Wagner, N.Y. Times 4 (Dec. 19, 1 932) (arguing further that states could effectively pre-
vent the return of the saloon). 
46. 75 Cong. R~.:c. at 4155 (statement of Sen. Brookhart); sec also id. at 4161 
(statement of Sen. Brookhart) (asking Sen. Norris whether Section Three would not 
mean that "if the States have concurrent power to regulate or prohibit the sale of intoxi-
cating liquors in a saloon ... that power just as high and just as dominating as the concur-
rent power of the Congress?"): id. at 4173 (colloquy between Senators Borah and Hast-
ings). 
47. Jd. at 4178 (statement of Sen. Black). 
48. ld. 
49. ld. at 4179. The vote was 33-32, with 31 not voting. Not everyone was enthusi-
astic about the devolution of power to the States. One member of the House complained 
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Even after some delay occasioned by the need for states to 
call and organize the ratification conventions, the requisite num-
ber of states had ratified the Amendment before 1933 was out. 
To the extent that the delegates to state conventions left any re-
cord of what they thought the Amendment would do, 5° they pro-
claimed the Amendment to have restored a measure of power to 
states that the states did not previously possess, a!ld insulated 
the exercise of that power from federal interference. ' 1 
that Section Two embodied ·'the extreme of State rights." 76 Cong. Rec. 2774, 2776 
(1933) (extension of remarks by Rep. Lea). "It is theoretically unsound," Rep. Lea com-
plained, 
to propose that each State in the country shall have the right to compel the 
Federal Government, without any discretion of Congress, to support whatever 
statutory liquor laws the State legislatures sec fit to write, however unwise or 
improvident. . . . Under this color of constitutional sanction, a State might pass 
a law to interfere with legitimate interstate shipments .... No one could antici-
pate the many varied, and perhaps unwise, provisions that might be written by 
the various States of the country .... 
!d. No one responded that such "unwise or improvident" state laws would be forbidden 
by the Amendment. 
50. For the documentary record of the ratifying conventions, sec Everette Somer-
ville Brown, Ratification of the Twenty-first Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States (U. of Michigan Press, 1938). Most states' conventions ratified the Amendment 
unanimously and without substantive debate. New Hampshire's convention lasted all of 
seventeen minutes. Sec id at 284. To date, the Twenty-first Amendment is the only 
amendment to be ratified by specially-convened state conventions. For more on the rati-
fication process in the states, sec Everett S. Brown, The Ratification of the Twenty-first 
Amendment, 29 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. HXl5 (1935). 
51. Brown, Ratification of the Twenty-first Amendment to the Constitwion of the 
United States at 50 (cited in note 50) (Amendment "rcturn[cd] to the peoples of the sev-
eral states ... their constitutional right to govern themselves in their internal affairs ... ") 
(statement of President of the Connecticut Convention), id. at 167 (noting that the 
Twenty-first Amendment "expresses a widespread and deep-rooted conviction among 
our people of the right of the states to govern their internal and local affairs, and it dcsig-
ratcs as one office of the Federal authority ... to uphold the states in their authority") 
(statement of Miss Laura Clay). 
Contemporary accounts of the debate over repeal and of the congressional debates 
over the proposed Amendment support the conclusion that the issue was not simply 
about constitutionalizing Webb-Kenyon, or about protecting dry states from liquor. Sec, 
e.g., Leuer to the Editor, N.Y. Times~ 4 at 5 (Feb. 5, 1933) (discussing repeal of Prohibi-
tion in terms of "rcstor[ing] control of liquor traffic to the States"; Prohibition had ef-
fected "the transfer of police power over the liquor traffic to the Federal Government," 
repeal would "rcstor[e] ... this power to the States"); Wets Select Plan for Test in House, 
N.Y. Times (Jan. 12, 1932) (describing effort by House supporters of repeal to craft lan-
guage of repeal amendment, including provision "that Congress shall not interfere with 
the liquor traffic within States that desire to authorize manufacture or sale of liquor"); A 
Liquor Plan, N.Y. Times 16 (Sept. 19, 1932) (noting views of New York supporter of re-
peal that "the first subsequent duty of the States is to prepare to resume regulation of the 
liquor traffic" and that "[t]heir authority in that province ... must be sole and undtvided. 
No further Federal intrusion on it must be tolerated."); Unrepealing Repeal, N.Y. Ttmes 
~ 4, at 4 (Jan. 8, 1933) (editorial critical of proposed Section Three; concluding that 
"Federal prohibition is to be destroyed by retaining it in part. ... It leaves the regulation 
of the liquor traffic partly in the hands of the States, partly in the hands of the Federal 
Government."; terming it a ''two-faced and dishonest repeal"); ''Modified Repeal," N.Y. 
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* * * 
Prior to the ratification of the Twenty-first Amendment, the 
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine had restricted state author-
ity over the importation of alcohol into their territory, which un-
dermined state regulatory efforts and eroded congressional pro-
tections for bolder state law enforcement efforts. When 
structuring the repeal of Prohibition, Congress heeded the de-
mands of states that the Amendment secure states power over 
alcohol that would be immune from a Congress dominated by 
wets or drys, which may repeal or greatly expand congressional 
statutes like the Webb-Kenyon Act, and insulate state alcohol 
regulation from dormant Commerce Clause challenges that had 
bedeviled enforcement efforts prior to Prohibition. Proponents 
of state control vigorously (and successfully) opposed an attempt 
to give Congress "concurrent" authority over the "saloon," in 
large part for fear that congressional power would eventually 
eclipse the power of the states over alcohol. The message from 
Congress, the state ratifying conventions, and the text of the 
Amendment itself seemed clear: Liquor was different. In the 
years immediately,,following ratification of the Twenty-first 
Amendment, the Supreme Court's opinions confirmed this con-
sensus. 
Times 18 (Jan. II, 1933) (arguing that, as reported out of the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee, the amendment continues Prohibition in part; claiming that Section Two is superflu-
ous because Webb-Kenyon was still in effect, and that the proposed Section Three "pro-
longs the power of Federal Prohibition"; noting that "There is likely to be a perpetual 
effort to restore the old regime." It was enough that "the Federal hand is not to be taken 
off the throats of the States, that they are not to be free to deal, each in its own way, with 
the liquor traffic, is more than enough to condemn this section."); Shouse Hits Blaine 
Plan, N.Y. Times 8 (Feb. 7, 1933) (reporting charges of the President of the Association 
Against the Prohibition Amendment that proposed repeal amendment "'prolong[ed) the 
necessity of Federal jurisdiction in an intolerable way"'); Repeal Voce Today Sec in the 
Senate; Filibuster Broken, N.Y. Times I (Feb. 16, 1933) ("Senator Borah [a Prohibition 
supporter) agreed that the government would be helpless to prevent the return of the 
saloon.. . 'Once you legalize liquor, as a practical proposition you cannot possibly su-
pervise its sale'. . . 'If we should execute such a power as herein prescribed we would be 
operating against the States that had legalized a saloon system."'); TRB, Washington 
Notes, The New Republic 233 (July 13, 1932) ("The division today is not between the 
Drys and the Wets, not between the advocates of the Eighteenth Amendment and its 
opponents. The division is between the moderate Wets, who were once Drys, and the 
extreme Wets; between those who want state control of the liquor business under federal 
supervision and those who want state control without limitation."). But sec Senate Votes 
Dry Repeal By Conventions In States; House Will Act Monday, N.Y. Times I (Feb. 17, 
1933) (describing Section Two as "a provision for Federal protection of dry States"). 
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III. THE COURT INTERPRETS THE 
TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT 
Soon after the ratification of the Twenty-first Amendment, 
the Supreme Court rejected several challenges to state liquor 
regulation. Possible protectionist motives for the regulations 
notwithstanding, the Court held that the Amendment was in-
tended to return total control over liquor to the States. Begin-
ning in the 1940s, however, the Court instead applied the dor-
mant Commerce Clause doctrine to state regulations not directly 
related to importation of liquor into the state for delivery or use. 
While many regulations were upheld, the door was open to chal-
lenge "unreasonable" alcohol regulations. In the mid-1960s, a 
pair of decisions that ostensibly protected the States' "core" 
Twenty-first Amendment power over importation struck down 
state regulations of alcohol imports for the first time since the 
1890s. These cases contained language employed in later cases 
to invalidate state liquor regulations under the dormant Com-
merce Clause. 
A. THE YOUNG'S MARKET CASES 
In State Board of Equalization of California v. Young's 
Market Co. ,52 California's $500 license-fee for the privilege of 
importing beer from outside the state was upheld against Four-
teenth Amendment and Commerce Clause challenges. "Prior to 
the ratification of the Twenty-first Amendment," Justice 
Brandeis wrote, "it would obviously have been unconstitutional 
to have imposed any fee" on importation, "because the fee 
would be a direct burden on interstate commerce. "53 The 
Amendment, he continued, "abrogated the right to import 
free ... intoxicating liquors. "54 The plaintiffs, on the other hand, 
were asking the Court to read the Amendment to authorize only 
state prohibition in toto, "but if it permits ... manufacture an~ 
sale, it must let imported liquors compete ... on equal terms. "~ 5 
To adopt this argument, he concluded, "would involve not a con-
struction of the amendment, but a rewriting of it. "56 For 
52. 299 U.S. 59 (1936). 
53. !d. at 62. 
54. !d. 
55. !d. 
56. !d. One student note termed the Young's Market approach "unpurposive ver-
balism," and criticized the result for "sanction[ing]thc Balkanization of American trade, 
commerce, and industry." Note, 55 Yale L.J. at 819 (cited in note 27); see also Note, 27 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 129-30 (cited in note 27) (stating the Young's Market line of cases 
inaugurated "a tariff war in regard to liquor commerce") (footnote omitted). 
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Brandeis, the greater power of total prohibition surely entailed 
lesser restrictions, including state monopoly of manufacture and 
sale, prohibition on importations, high taxation on imports, and 
partial prohibition.57 Two years later, when a Minnesota statute 
discriminating against out-of-state liquor was challenged, Justice 
Brandeis wrote that Young's Market had "settled" the question 
whether "under the amendment, discrimination against im-
ported liquor is permissible although it ~s not an incident of rea-
sonable regulation of the liquor traffic. "~ 8 
In 1939, the Court reaffirmed the holding of Young's Mar-
ket in a pair of opinions also written by Justice Brandeis.59 Up-
holding a Missouri ban on the alcohol imports from states that 
themselves had discriminatory import policies, Justice Brandeis 
held the alleged discriminatory intent of the Missouri statute to 
be entirely beside the point.6° Following the Twenty-first 
Amendment, he wrote, "the right of a State to prohibit or regu-
late the importation of intoxicating liquor is not limited by the 
commerce clause. "61 In a companion case decided the same day 
involving a similar Michigan statute, Brandeis wrote that "the 
right of a state to prohibit or regulate the importation of intoxi-
cating liquor is not limited by the commerce clause; and ... dis-
crimination between domestic and imported intoxicating liquors, 
or between imported intoxicating liquors, is not prohibited by 
the equal protection clause. "62 
auguratcd ··a tariff war in regard to liquor commerce") (footnote omitted). 
57. See Young's Market, 299 U.S. at63 ("If it may permit the domestic manufacture 
and sale of beer and exclude all made without the state, may it not, instead of absolute 
exclusion, subject the foreign article to a heavy importation fcc"l"). 
58. Mahoney v. Joseph Triner Corp., 304 U.S. 401, 403 (1938). 
59. Sec Joseph 5. Finch & Co. v. McKiurick, 305 U.S. 395, 397-98 (1939); Indian-
apolis Brewing Co. v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 305 U.S. 391 (1939). 
60. Joseph 5. Finch & Co. 305 U.S. at 397-98. 
61. I d. at 398. 
62. Indianapolis Brewing Co., 305 U.S. at 394 (citation omitted). Nor, he added, 
was there any merit to the claim that such laws violated due process. "The substantive 
power of the State to prevent the sale of intoxicating liquor is undoubted." I d. Sec also 
Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 308 U.S. 132 (1939) (upholding Kentucky act that imposed rigor-
ous conditions on the manufacture and transport of liquor). The appellant in Ziffrin 
complained that the act '·prevent[sj an authorized interstate contract carrin from con-
tinuing an established business of transporting exports of liquors from Kentucky in inter-
state commerce exclusively." Id. at 137. The Court again, per Justice McReynolds, re-
jected such arguments: "The Twenty-first Amendment sanctions the right of a state to 
legislate: concerning intoxicating liquors brought from without, unfettered by the Com-
merce Clause. Further, she may adopt measures reasonably appropriate to effectuate 
these inhibitions and exercise full police authority in respect of them." I d. at 138. De-
spite the fact that the Kentucky law governed exports, Justice McReynolds contended 
that, again, the power to absolutely prohibit the manufacture and sale of intoxicants en-
compassed myriad lesser powers, including the restrictions adopted here by Kentucky. 
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The only "limit" the Court placed on the Amendment dur-
ing the 1930s resulted from the Court's holding that the 
Amendment did not apply in a federal enclave, like a national 
park.63 Given this unambiguous early construction of the 
Amendment by the Court, it is surprising that later Courts have 
characterized the intent of Section Two as "obscur[ e]" and 
claimed that "[n]o clear consensus" concerning its meaning "is 
apparent."64 Even if the legislative intent had been somewhat 
ambiguous (which it was not),65 the early decisions of the Court 
are not. If states sought to regulate the importation of alcohol 
into their borders, neither the dormant Commerce Clause doc-
trine nor the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Sec id. at 139. For more on Ziffrin, sec Note, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 671 (1940). 
Many early commentators found the Court's conclusion that the Twenty-first 
Amendment abrogated the Fourteenth Amendment the most troubling part of the 
Young's Market line of cases. Sec, e.g., Crabb, 12 U. Oct. L.J. at 28 (cited in note 27) 
(arguing that "the words of the Amendment do[ J not appear to sanction discrimination 
whose purpose it is to secure commercial advantage to the domestic product over the 
foreign" and that such laws would, but for Young's Market, ct al., violate the Equal Pro-
tection Clause); Wiser and Arledge, 7 Gco. Wash. L. Rev. at 413-14 (cited in note 27) 
(concluding that the Twenty-first Amendment "deals with public health and morals, not 
with economics and commerce" whose undoubted purpose was to allow states freedom 
to exercise police and taxing powers, but not to grant discriminatory powers that violate 
other constitutional provisions, like the Fourteenth Amendment); Note, 27 N.Y.U. L. 
Rev. at 130-31 (cited in note 27) ("By determining that state power over liquor traffic is 
not limited by the Commerce Clause or the Equal Protection Clause, the courts have 
sown the seeds of internal con!licts between the states."). 
63. Collins v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 304 U.S. 518,538 (1938) ("As territorial 
jurisdiction over [Yosemite[ Park was in the United States, the State could .wt legislate 
for the area merely on account of the XXI Amendment."). 
64. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 274 (1984). That the legislative 
history of the Twenty-first Amendment in general, and of Section Two in particular, is 
unclear or ambiguous is a familiar refrain in nearly all of the commentary on it. Sec, e.g., 
Douglass, 49 Duke L.J. at 1631 (cited in note 3) (claiming that the legislative history 
"supports three distinct intcrpn:tations of section two"); id. at 1636 (asserting that no 
"single, correct interpretation of the effect of the Amendment had on state authority to 
regulate commerce in alcoholic beverages following the repeal of Prohibition" is possible 
from either text or legislative history); id. at 1659 ("Neither the plain meaning of the text 
of the Twenty-first Amendment nor its legislative history resolves whether, and to what 
extent, the Amendment created a Dormant Commerce Clause exception for state regula-
tions of commcrc~.: in alcoholic bewrages."); Freeman, 13 Hastings Const. L.Q. at 361 
(cited in note 27) (stating that "the drafters of the Amendment did not leave a clear re-
cord of their intent in including Section Two"); id. at 374 (claiming that "the haste and 
festivity of the movement toward repeal obscured the debates in the states") (footnote 
omitted); DavidS. Ycrsfelt, Note, The Effect of the Twenty-first Amendment on State Au-
thority to Control Intoxicating Liquors, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 1578, 1579 (1975) ("Central to 
the ambiguity of the twenty-first amendment is its unclear legislative history."); Note, 
Economic Localism in State Alcoholic Beverage Laws- Experience Under the Twenty-
first Amendment, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 1145, 1147 (1959) (concluding that evidence from con-
gres.~ional debates and state conventions "arc at best inconclusive in showing the purpose 
of section 2"). 
65. See Part II. 
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Amendmt:nt limited the exercise of the power granted by the 
Twenty-first Amendment. 
B. THEMOVEAWAYFROM YOUNG'S MARKET 
A generation after Young's Market, however, the Supreme 
Court embarked upon a doctrinal course much different than 
that charted by Justice Brandeis. The hint of a new direction is 
evident as early as 1941, when the Court decided the first of two 
cases involving regulations of alcohol shipped through a state, 
but not imported into that state for delivery or use.66 While the 
Court upheld the regulations in both cases, it did so based not on 
the authority of the Twenty-first Amendment, but rather on the 
grounds that the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine did not 
66. Sec Career v. Virginia, 321 U.S. 131 (1944); Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 U.S. 
390 (1941 ). The regulations required, for example, the usc of the most direct routes 
through the state, the carrying of bills of lading, the posting of bond, and the identifica-
tion of the consignees who had to be able to kgally take possession of the alcohol at the 
place of delivery. Sec Carter, 321 U.S. at 133-34; Duckworth, 314 U.S. at 392. Abuses of 
the mail-order liquor trade that flourished before passage of the Webb-Kenyon Act and 
before the ratification of th<.: Eighteenth Amendment, as well as fear of diversion for il-
licit usc, were largely responsible for these regulations. Sec Bickel and Schmidt, History 
of the Supreme Court at 440 (cited in note 19); Hamm, Shaping the Eighteenth Amend-
ment at 69-79, 178-88 (cited in note 13). 
One commentator maintains that the "seeds of retreat" were sown in the Ziffrin 
case, in which Kentucky's liquor control statute was upheld as applied to liquor manufac-
tured for export, since the case "appeared to apply a reasonableness test" to the regula-
tions. Sidney J. Spaeth, Comment, The Twenty-first Amendment and State Control Over 
lmoxicating Liquor: Accommodating the Federal Interest, 79 Cal. L. Rev. 161, 184 (1991). 
But there arc problems with this reading of Ziffrin. First, the alcohol being regula:cd 
was subject to export, thus the very subject of regulation was not within the text of Sec-
tion Two, which addressed importation for "delivery or usc therein," not exports. Never-
theless, Justice McReynolds felt that the power exercised by the state flowed from the 
Twenty-first Amendment. Sec Ziffrin, 308 U.S. at 138 (''The Twenty-first Amendment 
sanctions the right of a state to legislate concerning intoxicating liquors brought from 
without, unfettered by the Commerce Clause .... Further, she may adopt measures rea-
sonably appropriate to effectuate these inhibitions and exercise full police authority in 
respect of them."). Read in context, Justice McReynolds' usc of the term "reasonably 
appropriate" hardly seems intended to restrict state power. Contemporary commenta-
tors also read Ziffrin as further expanding the Court's previous broad constructions of 
the Twenty-first Amendment. Sec, e.g., Crabb, 12 U. Oct. L.J. at 17 (cited in note 27) 
(remarking that Ziffrin "has made state ... regulatory statutes applicable to liquor within 
the state destined for exportation. This decision is in keeping with the general policy fol-
lowed by the Supreme Court in giving a broad interpretation to the Amendment"); Note, 
53 Harv. L. Rev. at 672 (cited in note 62) (restating the logic of !he holding: "because of 
the unrestricted power to prohibit imports and the power to forbid manufacture even for 
export ... a state may effectively prevent any exportation, and that if it may prohibit, it 
may permit such exports subject to any condition it wishes"; though inconsistent with 
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, Court able to avoid discussion of doctrine be-
cause of the "extensive control over other aspects of the liquor traffic given the states by 
Acts of Congress and the Twenty-first Amendment"). 
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prohibit "reasonable" police measures. 67 At first glance, the 
Court's failure to invoke the Twentv-first Amendment seems 
understandable. After all, as Justi~e Stone observed, "[t]he 
commerce here is transportation alone, there being no question 
of sale or use within the state of regulation. "68 
However, as Justices Jackson69 and Frankfurter pointed out 
in their concurring opinions,70 regulation of cross-shipment was a 
reasonable means to prevent diversion of those shipments for in-
state "delivery or use therein." 71 Though they did not do so ex-
plicitly, Frankfurter and Jackson might have reminded their col-
leagues of Chief Justice Marshall's assertion in McCulloch v. 
Maryland that the grant of a power also implicitly granted the 
means to effectuate the grant. 72 State regulations of through 
67. Sec Carter, 321 U.S. at 135 ("W.: have recognized that the several slates in the 
absence: of federal legislation may require regulatory liccnses for through shipments of 
liquor in order to guard agamsl violations of their own laws."); Duckworth, 314 U.S. at 
394 ("While thc commerce clause has been interpretcd as reserving to Congress the 
power to regulate: interstate: ~ommercc in matters of national importance, that has never 
been deemed to exclude the stales from regulating primarily matters of local concern 
with respect to which Congress has not exercised its power, even though the regulation 
has some effect on interstate commerce."). 
68. Duckworth, 314 U.S. at 393. 
69. Sec Duckworth, 314 U.S. at 399 (Jackson, J., concurring) (''Transportation itself 
prescnt.:d no special danger~ or hazards, but it might be a step in evading and undermin-
ing a policy as to usc sale of liquor which the slate has a right to prescribe for itself. 
Regulated transportation is a necessary incident of regulated consumption and distribu-
tion."). 
70. Sec Carter, 321 U.S. at 140-41 (Frankfurter. J., concurring). 
71. The legislation is sustainable under the Twenty-first Amendment on one of 
two considerations.. . Since we arc dealing with a constitutional amendment 
that should be broadly and colloquially interpreted, liquor that enters a State in 
the manner in which the liquor h.:re came into Virginia may, without undu.: lib-
erty with the English language, be deemed for "delivery" there even though it is 
consigned for another State .. 
In th.: alt.:rnativ.:, sine.: Virginia has power to prohibit the importation of 
liquor within that Comr.10nwealth, it may effectuate that purpose by measures 
deemed by it necessary to prevent evasion of its policy by pretended through-
shipments .... 
!d. at 140-42 (Frankfurtcr, J, concurring). Justice Jackson warned that by characterizing 
the through-shipment regulations as acceptable exercises of stale "police powers," the 
Court was sending thc Twcnty-first Amcndmcnt "on [its] way to becoming another ·al-
most forgotten' clausc of the Constitution.... It certainly applies to nothing else.'' 
Duckworth, 314 U.S. at399 (Jackson. J., concurring). 
72. McCulloch v. Mary/and, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) (noting that "the 
powers given to the gover~menl imply the ordinary means of execution"). The Court 
could also have found support for reliance on the Twenty-first Amendment in Ziffrin, 
Inc. v. Reeves. 308 U.S. 132, 138 (1939), where the Court upheld Kentucky regulations 
limiting the transportation of liquor ow of the state without complying with a number of 
requirements. "Having power absolutely to prohibit manufacture, sale, transportation, or 
possession of intoxicants," the Court concluded, it was "imperative" that the Court allow 
the state "to permit these things only under definitely prescribed conditions." Id. It 
hardly would have required judicial sorcery to uphold Virginia or Arkansas's regulations 
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shipments to prevent diversion, they might have argued, are 
"necessary and proper" to the enforcement of states' liquor 
laws.73 
The through-shipment cases were important for the future 
of the Court's Twenty-first Amendment jurisprudence because 
they suggested (pace the Court's earlier decisions) that a state's 
regulation of the liquor trade was still partly subject to the stric-
tures of the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. Thereafter, 
state regulations not clearly governing importation for delivery 
or use were subject to scrutiny for reasonableness. 74 Such quali-
fications were not lost on academic commentators who urged the 
Court to intervene when economic protectionism, rather than 
temperance, seemed the primary factor motivating state regula-
tions.75 
by extending the reasoning in Ziffrin. In retrospect, Ziffrin was the high water mark of 
the Court's willingness to expand the scope of the power granted by the Twenty-first 
Amendment. 
73. Justice Frankfurter also took the Court to task for assuming the "impossibk 
task" of adjudicating, by way of a vague balancing test, the reasonableness of the state's 
regulation of its liquor traffic. Carter, 321 U.S. at 143 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
"Such canons of adjudication," he wrote, "open wide the door of conflict and confusion 
which have ... characterized the liquor controversies in this Court and in no small meas-
ure formed part of the unedifying history which led first to the Eighteenth and then to 
the Twenty-first Amendment." !d. at 142 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). The introduction 
of the balancing test probably owes to the inllucncc of Justice Stone, who wrote the 
Duckworth opinion, and who, at the time, was persuading his colleagues on the Court to 
applying an all-things-considered balancing test when assessing the validity of state regu-
lations under the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. Sec, e.g., Southern Pacific Co. v. 
Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945); California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109 (1941); South Caro-
lina v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938); sec also Alphcus T. Mason, Harlan Fiske 
Scone: Pillar of the Law 490-93 (Viking Press, 1956) (describing the evolution of Stone's 
views); Noel T. Dowling,lnterstace Commerce and State Power, 27 Va. L. Rev. I (1940). 
74. Moreover, the usc of Justice Stone's emerging balancing test would have impor-
tant consequences, because Stone suggested in other Commerce Clause cases that his 
balancing test should be applied only after determining that the regulations at issue du 
not discriminate against out-of-state interests. Sec, e.g., Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. at lll4 
n.2. 
75. Sec, e.g., Crabb, 12 U. Oct. L.J. at 26 (cited in note 27) (commenting that dis-
criminatory liquor laws "have no perceptible relation to the protection of a dry or regula-
tory state policy"); Note, 27 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 132-33 (cited in note 27) (discriminatory 
liquor laws ought not be shielded from application of unconstitutional conditions due-
trine); Note, 55 Yale L.J. at 816 (cited in note 27) (urging "redefinition" of liquor regula-
tion power "grounded on the conception that state liquor legislation escapes the interdict 
of the Commerce Clause and other state eonstitutionallimitations only when represent-
ing a valid exercise of state police power"; "it would not require boldness beyond the 
capacity of the Supreme Court to interpolate the word 'proper' to modify 'laws'" in Sec-
tion Two) (footnote omitted); Vcrsfelt, 75 Colum. L. Rev. at 1585 (cited in note 64) 
("Plenary state authority over imports was designed to free the states to protect their 
citizens from the harmful effects of unregulated imported liquor. The social dangers 
which prompted the amendment exist whenever liquor enters a state, regardless of ori-
gin."). 
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C. HOSTETTER AND lAMES B. BEAM DISTILLING 
Justice Jackson's warning that the Twenty-first Amendment 
was in danger of becoming another "almost forgotten" clause of 
the Constitution was all but confirmed in 1964, when the Court 
decided Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corporation76 
and Department of Revenue v. James B. Beam Distilling Co.77 
On the same day, for the first time in over sixty years (and for 
the first time since the ratification of the Twenty-first Amend-
ment), the Court struck down two state liquor control laws.78 
While purporting to preserve states' core Twenty-first Amend-
ment power over importation, both opinions offered a revisionist 
interpretation of the Amendment that is at odds with both its 
history and early Supreme Court interpretations. When severely 
circumscribing the very state power the Court left undisturbed, 
lower courts now quote liberally from these cases. 
Hostetter arose when the State of New York attempted to 
shut down a duty-free liquor store ("Idlewild") that operated out 
of John F. Kennedy International Airport.79 Idlewild purchased 
its inventory from bonded warehouses located outside New 
York State, then had it delivered to Idlewild where the alcohol 
was stored until sale. 80 Idlewild's purchase and storage of alco-
76. 377 U.S. 324 (1964). 
77. 377 u.s. 341 (1964). 
78. Sec generally Note, The Evolving Scope of Stale Power Under the Twenty-first 
Amendmem: The 1964 Liquor Cases, 19 Rutgers L. Rev. 759 (1965). Most commentators 
agree that both cases marked a watershed moment in the Court's interpretation of the 
Twenty-first Amendment. Sec, e.g., Shanker, 85 Ya. L. Rev. at 372 (cited in note 3) (de-
scribing Hostetter as an "unequivocal repudiation" of the Young's Market line of cases); 
Spaeth, 79 Cal. L. Rev. at 185 (cited in note 66) (decisions "consummated a full retreat 
from earlier broad readings'' of the Amendment); hut sec Note, 19 Rutgers L. Rev. at 
760, 776 (cited in note 78) (suggesting that "the historic unrestrained state power over 
liquor has not been substanually affected" and that decisions represent neither "a depar-
ture from the Court's traditional refusal to prevent states form erecting economic harri-
ers to interstate commerce m liquor"). In fairness to the author of the Rutgers Note. 
Hostetter's importance became clearer only after later Court cases. As late as 1975, an-
other student commentator was able to qualify the observation that Justice Stewart's lan-
·uage "may suggest that the federal-state relationship should he n.:examined" on a case· 
oy-casc basis to balance state interests under the Twenty-first Amendment with federal 
interests protected by the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, with the remark that 
Stewart's language '·should be read with [Hostetter's] peculiar facts in mind." Ycrsfclt, 75 
Colum. L. Rev. at 1594 (cited in note 64). 
79. Hostetter, 377 U.S. at 325. 
80. Idlewild sold only to "departing international airline travelers" whose "tickets 
and boarding cards indicate[d] their imminent departure." !d. at 325. At time of pur-
chase, "a customer [got] nothing but a receipt .... The liquor which he orders is trans-
ferred directly to the departing aircraft on documents approved by United States Cus-
toms" and was then "delivered to the customer [when] he arrive[d] at his foreign 
destination." !d. 
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hal were made pursuant to regulations of the U.S. Customs Ser-
vice, which had "inspected [Idlewild's] place of business and ex-
plicitly approved its proposed method of operations."81 When 
New York determined that Idlewild's business violated state law, 
it sought an injunction to close it. Idlewild responded by filing 
suit, claiming that the injunction violated the Commerce 
Clause.82 The Court agreed with Idlewild, holding that New 
York had no power to close the duty-free shop.83 
Justice Potter Stewart began by acknowledging that the 
Amendment and the Court's previous decisions "unques-
tion[ ably]" free a state from the Commerce Clause's strictures 
when the state restricted the importation of liquor "destined for 
use, distribution, or consumption within its borders, "84 citing 
Young's Market, Indianapolis Brewing Co., and Joseph Triner 
Corporation, among other cases. But, Justice Stewart claimed, 
the facts here were different. As he characterized the issue, the 
Court was asked to decide 
whether the Twenty-first Amendment so far obliterates the 
Commerce Clause as to empower New York to prohibit abso-
lutely the passage of liquor through its territory, under the su-
pervision of the United States Bureau of Customs acting un-
der federal law, for delivery to customers in foreign 
countries. 85 
To draw from these cases the conclusion, he wrote, "that the 
Twenty-first Amendment has somehow operated to 'repeal' the 
Commerce Clause" in cases involving liquor "would ... be an 
absurd oversimplification."86 That would mean that "Congress 
would be left with no regulatory power over interstate or foreign 
commerce in intoxicating liquor," a result Stewart found to be 
"patently bizarre" and "demonstrably incorrect."87 
He went on to say that "[b]oth the Twenty-first Amend-
ment and the Commerce Clause are parts of the same Constitu-
tion" and "each must be considered in the light of the other."88 
81. Id. at 326. 
82. ld. at 327. 
83. Id. at 328. 
84. ld. at 330. 
85. Id. at 329 (footnol\.: omitted). 
86. Id. at 331-32. 
87. ld. at 332 (citing Jameson & Co. v. Morganthau, 307 U.S. 171, 172-73 (1939) 
(per curiam)). Morganthau was a citing a per curiam decision in which the Court upheld 
the Federal Alcohol Administration Act against a claim that the Twenty-first Amend-
ment gave States exclusive control over liquor. 
88. !d. 
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New York's attempt to bar Idlewild from doing business he 
compared with California's earlier, unsuccessful attempt to pro-
hibit shipments of liquor through the state that were destined for 
Yosemite National Park, a federal enclave.89 This led Stewart to 
"a like conclusion" because "ultimate delivery and use is not in 
New York but in a foreign country" and New York "has not 
sought to regulate or control the passage of intoxicants through 
her territory" to prevent diversion.90 "Rather, the State has 
sought totally to prevent transactions carried on under the aegis 
of a law passed by Congress in the exercise of its explicit 
power ... to regulate commerce with foreign nations. This New 
York cannot constitutionally do. "91 
Note the difference that rephrasing the question made. Jus-
tice Stewart conceded that if the issue was merely state regula-
tion of imports for delivery or use in New York, the state would 
have prevailed under the Young's Market line of cases. How-
ever, he avoided the Young's Market precedents (i) by claiming 
that through-shipment, not importation, was involved; (ii) by 
implying that New York's liquor laws were to some degree pre-
empted by the federal customs regulations enacted; and (iii) by 
implying that the involvement of the Customs Bureau converted 
JFK into some sort of federal enclave. 
Yet, upon close examination, it becomes apparent that if 
there are any "patently bizarre" conclusions and "absurd over-
simplifications" in Hostetter, they are contained in Justice Stew-
art's opinion. First, Justice Stewart utterly mischaracterized the 
nature of Idlewild's operation. While it might be true that no 
liquor was bought by Idlewild for "use" in New York (since pre-
sumably any use would take place at the final destination, when 
the liquor was claimed by the purchaser), there was "delivery," 
for purposes of Section Two of the Amendment, of the liquor to 
Idlewild's warehouse, where it sat as inventory until purchased 
and loaded onto international flights. 92 
89. !d. at 332-33 (discussing Collins v. Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 304 U.S. 518 
( 1938) ); sec also note 63 and accompanying text. 
90. !d. at 333. 
91. !d. at 334. 
92. Compare Justiw Black's description of Idlewild's business: 
Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corporation ... buys wines and intoxicating liq-
uors from bonded wholesale warehouses, brings them into the State of New 
York, and sells them at retail in the John F. Kennedy Airport.... Idlewild 
keeps a stock of liquor in New York ... and customers come into Idlewild's 
shop, choose the kind of liquor they want, and pay for 1t. These retail sales arc 
just like sales made by New York's hccnscd and regulated hquor dealers, wnh a 
single difference .... Idlewild arranges with its customers to put their pur-
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Then there is Stewart's discussion of the relationship be-
tween the Twenty-first Amendment and the Commerce Clause. 
To frame the question in terms of the Amendment's "repealing" 
the Commerce Clause clouds the issue. The evidence seems 
clear that, inasmuch as the importation of alcohol is involved, 
the Twenty-first Amendment created an "exception" to the 
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.93 It was that doctrine, after 
all, that earlier Courts had used to frustrate state regulation of 
the alcohol trade. 94 The source of the dormant Commerce 
Clause doctrine, moreover, is the delegation of power over 
commerce to Congress in Article I, § 8. So, in one sense, the 
Twenty-first Amendment did effect a "repeal" of at least some 
of the Commerce Clause's implicit limits on state power.95 
chases ... aboard planes so that the customers take physical possession of the 
liquor ... at destinations abroad. 
!d. at334 (Black. J., dissenting). 
93. Sec Part II. 
94. Sec notes 12-22 and accompanying text. 
95. This understanding was shared by state courts and lower federal courts in the 
years preceding Hostetler. Sec, e.g .. Chicago's Last Dep 't Store v. Indiana Alcoholic Bev. 
Comm 'n, 161 F. Supp. I, 4 (N.D. Ind. IY58) ("If the State has the prerogative and right to 
narrow and control traffic of alcoholic and spiritous beverages which arc in the flow of 
commerce passing through the Stale, then the State must assuredly have the power to 
regulate the importation and transportation of alcoholic beverages into the State. The 
lesser power is included within the greal<:r power."); Georgia v. Wenger, Y4 F. Supp. Y76, 
Y81 (E.D. Ill. IY50) ("Both by history and by judicial interpretation in the light of history 
the intended scope and purpose of [the Twenty-first Amendment and the Webb-Kenyon 
Act] is to divest liquor in interstate commerce of its interstate character so as to deprive 
it of all immunity from state control."); United States v. Renken, 55 F. Supp. I, 7 
(W.D.S.C. 1Y44) ("So the Twenty-first Amendment made the laws as to delivery and usc 
in the state of destination the test of kgality of interstate movement. This obviously 
gives to state law a much greater control over interstate liquor traffic than over com-
merce in any other commodity."); General Sales & Liquor Co. v. Becker, 14 F. 348, 350 
(E. D. Mo. IY36) ("The adoption of the Twenty-First Amendment has without doubt lim-
ited and qualified the commerce clause to the extent that state laws, regulating the im-
portation of liquor into a state, place no prohibited burden upon commerce."); Premier-
Pabst Sales Corporarion v. Grosscup, 12 F. Supp.Y70, Y72 (E. D. Penn. IY35) ("Under the 
Twenty-first Amendment when a state passes a law upon the subject of the importation 
of intoxicating liquors all importation in violation of that law is forbidden by the Consti-
tution and laws of the United States. The state of Pennsylvania has passed such a law 
and all imports of intoxicating liquors in violation of that law arc forbidden."); Joseph 
Triner Corp. v. Arundel, II F. Supp. 145, 147 (D. Minn. 1Y35) (holding that the Amend-
ment "left the states, territories, and posscssil•ns free to determine to what extent, if at 
all, intoxicating liquor should h.: a lawful subject of commerce within their limits"); 
Boller Beverages, Inc. v. Davis, liD A.2d 64, 67 (N.J. IY62) (holding that "the [Twenty-
first] Amendment sanctions th.: right of a state to legislate concerning alcoholic bever-
ages brought from without, unfettered by the Commerce Clause, and bestowed upon the 
states broad regulatory powers over the liquor traffic within their borders."); Scare v. 
Kilgore, 103 S.E.2d 321, 322 (S.C lY58) ("Since the adoption of the Twenty-first 
Amendment, each state has power, unfettered by the commerce clause, to regulate or 
prohibit the importation of intoxicating liquor for delivery or usc within its borders.''); 
Pompei Winery, Inc. , .. Bd. Liquor Conrrol, 146 N.E.2d 430, 433 (Ohio 1Y57) ("'The liq-
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uor industry of the entire nation was divested of ... constitutional guaranties (sic) 
[against state regulation] when it was divested of legal existence by the Eighteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and the Twenty-first Amendment 
cannot be said to have returned to the liquor industry any of the protection and guaran-
ties (sic) which may have existed prior to the passage of the Eighteenth Amendment."); 
Welborn v. Morley, 243 S.W.2d 635, 637 (Ark. 1951) (holding that "regulation in inter-
state commerce by local authority in the absence of Congressional action is admissible to 
protect the state from injuries arising from that commerce" under the Amendment); 
Capitol Distributing Co. eta/. v. Redwine, 57 S.E. 2d 578, 585 (Ga. 1950) ("If the portion 
of the act is discriminatory, it is outside the pale of protection of the due-process and 
equal-protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and the commerce clause of the 
Federal Constitution by reason of the Twenty-first Amendment thereof."); Atkins v. 
Manning, 56 S.E.2d 260, 262 (Ga. 1949) (holding that the "twenty-first Amendment re-
moves spiritous liquors and alcohol from the protection of the commerce clause to the 
extent necessary to allow the States to adopt and enforce appropriate laws and regula-
tions dealing with the subject, and thus to burden interstate commerce to this extent."); 
State v. Hall, 30 S.E.2d 158, 162 (N.C. 1944) ("Both by the Constitution of the United 
States (Amendment XXI), and the state statutes liquor has been placed in a category in 
some respects different from that of other articles of commerce, and the State's regula-
tions aimed at the suppression of its prohibited transportation and unlawful possession 
should not be held obnoxious to the interstate commerce clause of the United States 
Constitution unless clearly in conflict with granted Federal powers and congressional ac-
tion thereunder.'"); Superior Distributing Co. v. Davis, 7 N.E. 2d. 652, 655 (Ohio 1937) 
("It is the position of the state upon the issue presented that, by reason of the adoption of 
the Twenty-first Amendment to the Federal Constitution, the several states now have 
complete power and full authority to prohibit shipment of intoxicating beverages into 
each such state and hence may provide and enforce any regulation of such traffic without 
limitation or restraint."; rejecting defendant's claim that permit fee was invalid because it 
did not promote the health or safety of state citizens); State v. Arluno, 268 N.W. 179, 188 
(Iowa 1936) (holding that "under the Twenty-first Amendment to the Federal Constitu-
tion all importation of intoxicating liquor in violation of the Iowa law is forbidden."); 
Grillo v. State, 120 A.2d 384, 387 (Ct. App. Md. 1956) ("The Twenty-first Amendment, 
which repealed the Eighteenth Amendment, sanctions the right of a State to legislate 
concerning intoxicating liquors brought from without the State, unfettered by the Com-
merce Clause."); Dundalk Liquor Co. v. Tawes, 92 A.2d 560, 564 (Ct. App. Md. 1952) 
("'If a State for its own sufficient reasons deems it a desirable policy to standardize the 
price of liquor within its borders either by a direct price-fixing statute or by permissive 
sanction of such price-fixing in order to discourage the temptations of cheap liquor due 
to cutthroat competition, the Twenty-first Amendment gives it that power and the 
Commerce Clause does not gainsay it."); Schwartz v. Kelley, 18 Conn. Supp. 59, 65 
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1952) ("The attack on the law as a violation of the commerce clause of 
the federal constitution finds no support in the decisions of the United States Supreme 
Court. In a series of cases it has been firmly established that since the twenty-first 
amendment, the right of a state to prohibit or regulate the importation of intoxicating 
liquor is not limited by the commerce clause; nor are state regulations discriminating 
against imported liquor prohibited by the equal protection clause of the fourteenth 
amendment."); Edelbrew Brewery, Inc. v. Weiss, 84 A.2d 371, 373 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1951) 
("Sales by outside brewers to Pennsylvania brewers are not protected by the Commerce 
Clause of the Federal Constitution"); Ajax Distribwors v. Springer, 22 A.2d 838,841 (Ct. 
Ch. Del. 1941) (holding that "under the Federal Constitution, since the adoption of the 
Twenty-first Amendment, the possible scope of local tax statutes, or of other legislation 
of a regulatory or even of a prohibitory nature, affecting intoxicating liquors, is quite 
broad"). But sec Commonwealth v. One Dodge Motortruck, 187 A. 461, 471 (Pa. Super. 
Ct.) ("We arc of opinion, that this Commonwealth, in adopting and promulgating its sys-
tem for regulation, restraint and control of intoxicating liquors, in the exercise of its po-
lice power, had the right and authority to provide that it should be unlawful for any one 
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Stewart was correct when he wrote that "if the commodity in-
volved here were not liquor, but grain or lumber, the Commerce 
Clause, would clearly deprive New York" of its regulatory 
power.96 His observation, however, isn't relevant to the constitu-
tionality of New York's regulation of Idlewild. New York 
sought to regulate the importation of alcohol; and alcohol, the 
Twenty-first Amendment makes clear, is different. 
Is it "absurd" to conclude that Congress's commerce power 
was qualified by the Twenty-first Amendment as it would be by 
other J?rovisions of the Constitution, like the First Amend-
ment? Suppose that Congress exercised its commerce power in 
an attempt to force states to accept imports of intoxicating bev-
erages, regardless of what state law said. Would that congres-
sional act preempt contrary state law? If the Amendment was 
intended to mean anything, the answer to the question just 
posed must be "no." The proper question, then, is not whether 
Congress is stripped of its commerce power, but rather whether 
its commerce power is trumped by the Amendment when a con-
gressional act conflicts with state regulation of liquor, especially 
regulations dealing with importation.98 
Justice Stewart also suggested that New York was pre-
empted by federal law from regulating Idlewild. To him, the 
state's attempt to regulate a business that was operating under 
federal Customs Bureau supervision presented a conflict be-
to transport intoxicating liquors within this state without a permit from the Pennsylvania 
Liquor Control Board. provided the regulation adopted is reasonable and non-
discriminawry and is rea,_-.mably calculated to effect the purpose in view .. _") (emphasis 
added). 
96. Hosreuer, 377 U.S. at 329. 
97. Imagine that Congress passed a law prohibiting the shipment of printed materi-
als critical of the United States government in interstate commerce. Would it be "ab-
surd" to say in such case that the First Amendment had "repealed" the Commerce 
Clause to the extent necessary to protect freedom of speech? 
98. Two of Stewart's other arguments employed to prevent Idlewild's closure arc 
non-sequiturs. The Court's brief decision upholding the Federal Alcohol Administration 
Act, 27 U.S.C. §§ 201-219a (2000 Supp.), which Stewart cites in support of his contention 
that the Congress's commerce power remained intact, did not purport to authorize alco-
hol shipments otherwise forbidden by state law. Moreover, Stewart's citation to Collins 
was also of no relevance to the case: the airport was not a federal enclave over which the 
federal government could claim dominion. Sec Hosreuer, 377 U.S. at 334-35 (Black, J., 
dissenting) ("The airport where the sales take place is not a federal enclave where even 
as to liquor federal law can constitutionally control, but is New York territory subject to 
New York, not federal jurisdiction."); Collins v_ Yosemite Park & Curry Co., 304 U.S. 
518, 538 (1938). Commentators have mistakenly claimed that the warehouse was a fed-
eral enclave_ Sec, e.g., Freeman, 13 Hastings ConsL L.Q_ at 377 (cited in note 27) ("The 
unique facts in Idlewild- the presence of a federal enclave in the same physical space as 
a state facility-required a balancing of the federal and state regulating interests.")-
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tween federal and state authority.99 But Justice Stewart's refer-
ence to Idlewild's federal sanction is maddeningly vague. His 
only statutory citation is to a provision of the Tariff Act of 
1930,100 which deals with duty-free exports from "bonded manu-
facturing warehouses" in general, and says nothing about pre-
empting state authority where alcohol is involved. 101 This statute 
was passed two years before the ratification of the Twenty-first 
Amendment, and does not explicitly permit importation and 
storage of goods in bonded warehouses regardless of state law. 
One might also question whether it should be construed to pre-
empt state laws passed pursuant to a later constitutional 
amendment. 
Stewart's obtuseness is further evidenced in Hostetter's 
companion case, Department of Revenue v. James B. Beam Dis-
tilling Co., 102 decided on the same day. At issue was a Kentucky 
tax of ten cents on imported liquor, as applied to shipments of 
whiskey imported from Scotland. 103 The importer challenged 
the tax as a violation of the Import-Export Clause of the Consti-
tution;104 the State claimed the Twenty-first Amendment as a de-
fense. While conceding that it was consistent with the Import-
Export Clause for Kentucky to "regulate" or "completely pro-
hibit the importation of some intoxicants" or "to regulate and 
control, by taxation or otherwise, the distribution, use, or con-
sumption of intoxicants within her territory after they have been 
imported,"105 the Court nevertheless invalidated the tax. 
Though the Twenty-first Amendment makes no distinction be-
tween liquor imported from other states and that imported from 
abroad, the Court held that "[t]his Court has never so much as 
intimated that the Twenty-first Amendment has operated to 
permit what the Export-Import Clause precisely and explicitly 
forbids." 106 
99. Sec Hostetler, 377 U.S. at 329 (framing the issue of one in which the state is at-
tempting ''to prohibit absolutely the passage or liquor through its territory, under the 
supervision of the United States Bureau of Customs acting under federal law, for deliv-
ery to consumers in foreign countries") (footnote omitted); Bittker, Regulation of Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce at 13 (cited in note 12) (commenting that Stewart's reliance 
on the statute and regulations "suggests that [the case] was a federal preemption case"). 
100. Sec 19 U.S.C. ~ 1311 (1994). The section number is the same as it was in 1964. 
101. Neither could I find any regulations in effect presently or in 1964, which ad-
dressed the effect of the provision on state laws. 
102. 377 U.S. 341 (1964). 
103. !d. at342. 
104. Sec U.S. Const., Art. I,* 10, cl. 2. 
105. James B. Beam Disci/ling Co., 377 U.S. at 344. 
106. !d. at 344; sec also id. at 345-46 ("[n]othing in the language of the Amendment 
nor in its history leads to [the] extraordinary conclusion" that "the Twenty-first Amend-
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Justice Stewart never explains just why the near-total con-
trol of alcohol under Section Two could not have qualified the 
Import-Export Clause's flat prohibition. Arguably the Amend-
ment necessarily qualified that Clause, just as it had rendered 
the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine inapplicable to the in-
terstate liquor trade. 107 Furthermore, Stewart never adequately 
accounted for statements made in the Court's previous cases, 
which declare in no uncertain terms the right of states to tax im-
ported alcohol however they wished. Those cases also held the 
Fourteenth Amendment could operate as no restraint on the 
states in light of the Twenty-first, though the framers had not 
given the Amendment's relationship with the Fourteenth 
Amendment much thought either. 
Finally, the opinion in James B. Beam Distillers was incon-
sistent with a 1958 case in which the Supreme Court sustained 
the conviction of defendants charged with bringing rum into 
Texas from Mexico without paying state taxes. 108 The Supreme 
Court's per curiam opinion merely affirmed the state conviction, 
citing only the Twenty-first Amendment and Carter v. Vir-
ginia.109 Stewart explained away Gordon with a reference to the 
trial court's finding that the tax in that case was not levied on 
importation. 110 As Justice Black pointed out in his dissent, how-
ever, "these labels cannot obscure the fact that both in Gordon 
and in this case the same conduct was involved: the physical im-
portation of liquor from abroad into the State, at which point the 
State's interest in regulating or taxing the liquor came into play. 
Gordon did not-just as the Twenty-first Amendment does 
not-draw nice distinctions about where the imported liquor 
comes from. " 111 
ment has completely repealed the Export-Import Clause so far as intoxicants arc con-
cerned"). 
107. Sec also Versfelt, 75 Colum. L. Rev. at 1584-85 (cited in note 64) (noting that, 
as neither the text of the Amendment nor the history of its ratification makes any distinc-
tion regarding the source of the liquor, "[i]t would not ... have been so 'extraordinary' to 
conclude that the twenty-first amendment had 'repealed' the export-import clause with 
respect to intoxicants"); id. at 1585 ("The export-import clause's singular concern with 
shipments from abroad cannot distinguish it from the commerce clause, for the latter ap-
plies to foreign as well as domestic commerce.''). 
108. Sec Gordon v. Texas, 310 S.W.2d 328 (Tex. Crim. App. 1956), aff'd, 355 U.S. 
369 (1958) (per curiam). 
I 09. Gordon v. Texas, 355 U.S. 369, 369 (1958) (per curiam) ("The judgment is af-
firmed. Twenty-first Amendment to the Constitution of the United States."). 
110. James B. Beam Distilling Co., 377 U.S. at345. 
Ill. !d. at 349 (Black. J., dissenting). 
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If the ambi~uity introduced by the Court in the through-
transport cases' I- can be excused because the state regulations at 
issue did not directly address issues of "importation for delivery 
or use," Justice Stewart's two opinions are harder to explain. 
Stewart introduced uncertainty in cases squarely within the am-
bit of the Amendment's text, whose facts were indistinguishable 
from the Court's previous cases. While perhaps Hostetter could 
be understood as a preemption case, Justice Stewart's opinion 
seemed unwilling to put too much weight on that argument. Nor 
have subsequent Supreme Court and lower court decisions read 
the case so narrowly. Moreover, James B. Beam Distilling Co.'s 
dubious conclusion that the Amendment did not empower states 
to regulate foreign importation represented an abrupt about face 
from Gordon. 
D. POST-HOSTETTER SUPREME COURT CASES 
Subsequent opinions exploited this ambiguity and con-
structed an alternative line of cases. Those opinions built nei-
ther on Young's Market and its progeny, nor on the text and in-
tent of the Twenty-first Amendment itself. Rather, they relied 
on the statements from Hostetter and James B. Bean Distilling 
that the power of the Twenty-first Amendment could be subor-
dinated to other provisions of the Constitution, since both were 
"parts of the same Constitution" and that "each must be consid-
ered in the light of the other." These recent cases are selective 
in their quotations, however, and ignore Stewart's concession 
that a state was "unquestion[ably]" freed from the Commerce 
Clause when restricting the importation of liquor "destined for 
use, distribution, or consumption within its borders."113 
Cases decided after Hostetter continued to limit the use of 
the Twenty-first Amendment as a defense against challenges to 
state liquor laws. State drinking ages that applied different stan-
dards to men and women; 114 so-called "price affirmation" stat-
utes that pegged in-state sales prices to the price at which liquor 
is sold in other states;115 and restrictions on advertising were all 
I 12. Sec notes 66-75 and accompanying text. 
113. Hostetter, 377 U.S. at 330. 
114. S~.:c Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 206 (1976) (turning aside a Twenty-first 
Amendment defense to a state law that authorized the sale of reduced alcohol beer to 
women at age 18, but not to men; "( o ]nee passing beyond consideration of the Commerce 
Clause, the relevance of the Twenty-first Amendment to other constitutional provisions 
becomes increasingly doubtful"). 
115. Healy v. The Beer Institute, 491 U.S. 324 (1988); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. 
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struck down. 116 Nevertheless, each of these cases also contained 
language affirming the vast powers that the Twenty-first 
Amendment granted states to regulate alcohol, and stating that 
the Amendment removed Commerce Clause restrictions from 
that exercise. 117 But two decisions in particular further eroded 
whatever state power remained under the Twenty-first Amend-
ment. They are often quoted, along with Hostetter, in recent 
lower court opinions striking down state liquor regulation laws. 
In 1980, the Court held that a California anti-competitive 
liquor pricing system could not be sustained under the Twenty-
first Amendment. 118 Writing for a majority, Justice Powell be-
gan his analysis of the state's Twenty-first Amendment defense 
to the Sherman Act claim on an oddly apologetic note, "In de-
termining state powers under the Twenty-first Amendment," he 
wrote, "the Court has focused primarily on the language of the 
provision rather than the history behind it." 119 The language of 
the Amendment, Powell conceded, not only granted power over 
transportation and importation of liquor into states, but the 
Court's own early cases had also granted states "considerable 
regulatory power not strictly limited to importing and transport-
ing alcohol. "120 "Subsequent decisions," however, "have 
stressed that important federal interests in liquor matters," ex-
pressed in the Import-Export Clause and the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, "survived the ratification 
of the Twenty-first Amendment." 121 
Though Congress's power to regulate liquor under the 
Commerce Clause "is directly qualified by § 2," Powell went on 
to explain that "the Federal Government retains some Com-
merce Clause authority over liquor," the contours of which 
v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573 (1986). 
116. 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996). Sec also Wisconsin v. Con-
stantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 436 (1971) (stating that the Twenty-first Amendment docs not 
insulate stat<.: laws from Due Process Clause scrutiny). 
117. Sec, e.g., Brown-Forman Distillers, 476 U.S. at 584 (stating that the Twenty-first 
Amendment "gives the States wide latitude to regulat<.: the importation and distribution 
of liquor within their territories"); id. at 585 ("New York has a valid constitutional inter-
est in regulating sales of liquor within the territory of New York."); Craig, 429 U.S. at 
205-06 ("This Court's decisions since have confirmed that the Amendment primarily cre-
ated an exception to the normal operation of the Commerce Clause."); id. at 215 ("Every 
State has broad power under the Twenty-first Amendment to control the dispensation of 
alcoholic beverages within its borders.") (Stewart, J., concurring). 
118. California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum Co., 445 U.S. 97 
(1980). 
119. ld. at 106-07. 
120. !d. at 107. 
121. !d. at 108. 
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"were sharpened in [Hostetter]." 122 Quoting its admonition that 
the Twenty-first Amendment and the Commerce Clause had to 
be interpreted in light of one another and in the "context of the 
issues and interests ... in any concrete case," 123 Powell con-
cluded that Hostetter represented a "pragmatic effort to harmo-
nize state and federal powers" in conflicts like that presented by 
the state pricing scheme and the Sherman Act. 124 
Justice Powell's own pragmatic harmonization of the chal-
lenged statute and the Sherman Act resulted in a diminution of 
state power. "[T]here is no bri¥:ht line between federal and state 
powers over liquor," he wrote. 25 State controls imposed on liq-
uor, at least those not directly related to importation, "may be 
subject to the federal commerce power in appropriate situations. 
The competing state and federal interests can be reconciled onl.;,; 
after careful scrutiny of those concerns in a 'concrete case."' u 
Without explaining why a constitutional amendment must give 
way to a statute, the Court endorsed the state court's view that 
"the asserted state interests are less substantial than the national 
policy in favor of competition [expressed in the Sherman 
Act]." 127 
Four years later, Justice Brennan formalized Powell's ap-
parent balancing test in a case involving an Oklahoma law that 
prohibited the broadcast of certain advertisements for alcoholic 
beverages. 128 Upholding a challenge by a cable company that 
transmitted out-of-state signals into Oklahoma, the Court found 
that the Oklahoma law was preempted by FCC regulations. 129 
The Court specifically rejected the State's suggestion that the 
Twenty-first Amendment insulated its statute from invalidation. 
While conceding that "States enjoy broad power under § 2 
of the Twenty-first Amendment to regulate the importation and 
use of intoxicating liquors within their borders," Justice Brennan 
wrote that cases like Midcal "have made clear that the Amend-
122. ld. at 109. 
123. ld. (quoting Hosteuer, 377 U.S. at 332). 
124. ld. 
125. ld at 110. 
126. !d. 
127. !d. at 113. The Court added that it "need not consider whether the legitimate 
state interests in temperance and the protcctiof! of small retailers ever could prevail 
against the undoubted federal interest in a competitive economy," because "[t]hc unsub-
stantiated state concerns put forward in this case simply arc not or the same stature as the 
goals of the Sherman Act." !d. at 113-14. 
128. Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691 (1984). 
129. !d. at 708. 
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ment does not license the States to ignore their obligations under 
other provisions of the Constitution. " 13° Cases like Hostetter and 
Midcal demonstrate that "the Federal Government plainly re-
tains authority under the Commerce Clause to regulate even in-
terstate commerce in liquor." 131 To resolve conflicts between the 
federal and state governments, the Court must evaluate 
"whether the interests implicated by a state regulation are so 
closely related to the powers reserved by the Twenty-first 
Amendment that the regulation may prevail, notwithstanding 
that its requirements directly conflict with express federal poli-
cics."132 On balance, the Court found Oklahoma's interests in 
regulating out-of-state transmissions and the selectivity of the 
ban (which covered wine, but not beer) wanting: "when ... a 
state regulation squarely conflicts with the accomplishment and 
execution of the full purposes of federal law, and the State's cen-
tral power under the Twenty-first Amendment of regulating the 
times, places, and manner under which liquor may be imported 
and sold is not directly implicated," the balance tips in favor of 
the federal government. 133 
That same year, the Court held that Hawaii could not ex-
empt a locally-produced liquor from an otherwise generally-
applicable twenty percent excise tax, 134 subjecting a state alcohol 
regulation to the very dormant Commerce Clause analysis the 
Twenty-first Amendment was intended to disable. In Bacchus 
Imports Ltd. v. Dias, Justice White acknowledged that the 
Young's Market line of cases contained "broad language," but 
went on to say that the Court had come to "recognize[] the ob-
scurity of the legislative history of§ 2" and that "[n]o clear con-
sensus concerning the meaning of the provision is apparent." 135 
Whatever the intent or early cases indicated, Justice White con-
tinued, "[i]t is by now clear that the Amendment did not entirely 
remove state regulation of alcoholic beverages from the ambit of 
the Commerce Clause." 136 Citing Hostetter and Midcal Alumi-
num, White concluded that "one thing is certain" about the 
Amendment: "The central purpose of the provision was not to 
130. Id. at 712. Perhaps Justice Brennan forgot that Midcal concerned a conOict not 
between two constitutional provisions, hut rather between the Sherman Act and the 
Amendment. 
131. ld.at713. 
132. !d. at 714. 
133. !d. at 716. 
134. Bacchus Imports, Led. v. Dias, 46/l US. 263 (1LJX4). 
135. !d. at 274. 
136. !d. at 275. 
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empower States to favor local liquor industries by erecting barri-
ers to competition. . . . State laws that constitute mere economic 
protectionism are therefore not entitled to the same deference as 
laws enacted to combat the perceived evils of an unrestricted 
traffic in liquor." 137 
Until Bacchus, the Court had neither limited the right of 
states to set the terms upon which alcohol could be imported 
into the state, nor suggested that the Commerce Clause limited 
the state's regulation of alcohol within the state. Even Capital 
Cities Cable affirmed the state's power in this regard. With no 
historical or textual support, Justice White simply announced 
that the dormant Commerce Clause in fact did apply to the state 
alcohol regulations, despite the Twenty-first Amendment. 138 
Some of these decisions might again be defended on the 
grounds that the state regulations at issue (the pricing statutes 
and the discriminatory drinking age, for example) had little to do 
with regulating importation for delivery or use. However, the 
Court did not make this distinction clear, instead further muddy-
ing the waters with broad statements suggesting that "temper-
ance" was the only legitimate goal of state liquor regulation, and 
that any regulation smacking of economic protectionism was per 
se outside the ambit of the Twenty-first Amendment. 
137. !d. at 276. As I have argued, the ambiguity that Justice White finds in the 
Amendment's legislative hist01y is of his own making. Moreover, the Young's Markee 
line of cases squarely refutes the claim of an "economic protectionism" exception to the 
Twenty-first Amendment. Yet, after muddying the waters in Hosleller, James B. Beam 
Disci/ling, and Midcal, the Court apparently thought that its sub silenlo abandonment of 
Young's Markee required no further explanation or justification. 
138. One commentator observed that "[d]cspite assertions to the contrary, the Bac-
chus Court went beyond the Section Two precedents and found a new interpretation of 
the meaning or Section Two itself." Freeman, 13 Hastings Canst. L.Q. at 382 (cited in 
note 27). Despite the author's dissatisfaction with the reasoning of the majority's opin-
ion, he approved of its conclusion. !d. at 386-87. According to the author of this com-
ment, the drafters of the Twenty-first Amendment thought that it went no farther than 
the Webb-Kenyon Act, id. at 384; that the Amendment was merely intended to protect 
dry states, id.; and that the defeat of the proposed Section Three had no effect on the 
scope of Section Two. !d. at 384-85. The author presents little evidence to support his 
conclusions. 
Justice Brennan, whose opinion in Capica/ Cicies Cable made clear that states still 
possessed tremendous power over imported liquor and its distribution within the state, 
did not participate in Bacchus Imporcs. 
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STATE LIQUOR LAWS AND INTERNET 
ALCOHOL SALES: RECENT CASES 
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The full effect of the post-Hostetter decisions-especially 
the uncritical certitude of Bacchus that economic protectionism 
was beyond the pale of the Twenty-first Amendment-is appar-
ent in recent lower court cases striking down state regulations of 
liquor imports. These initial victories will, no doubt, encourage 
many more similar lawsuits against state liquor regulations. Dis-
trict courts, the courts of appeals, and, perhaps, the Supreme 
Court will be called upon to de(:ide these cases and, thus, will de-
cide whether the Twenty-first Amendment will be truly a "for-
gotten clause" of the Constitution. After reviewing these recent 
decisions, and a Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision that 
recently affirmed state power exercised under the Twenty-first 
Amendment, the following section suggests approaches that 
both the lower courts and the Supreme Court should take in fu-
ture cases. 
In Dickerson v. Bailey, 139 a federal district court judge 
struck down a Texas statute that prohibited the importation of 
more than three gallons of wine without a permit unless the resi-
dent p,ersonally accompanied the wine or liquor as it entered the 
state. 40 The district court, applying the "virtually per se rule of 
invalidity" 141 to which discriminatory laws are subject under tra-
ditional dormant Commerce Clause analysis, found that the 
statute "facially discriminates against out-of-state vintners and 
wine shippers" in order to "protect[ ] ... in-state liquor whole-
salers and retailers at the expense of out-of-state wine sellers." 142 
The Court rejected the State's claim that the Twenty-first 
Amendment authorized the law. Earlier decisions, like Young's 
Market, the judge wrote, had given way to a "balancing ap-
proach" in which the courts were no longer to assume that "the 
twenty-first amendment in essence repealed the commerce 
clause where liquor regulation was concerned." This new ap-
proach restricted the Amendment's "core" powers over trans-
portation and importation where regulation is undertaken for 
the purpose of economic protectionism. 143 The court put great 
139. 87 F. Supp. 2d 691 (S.D. Tex. 2000). 
140. !d. at 693; sec also id. at 691 (citing Tex. Alcohol Bcv. Code * 107.7 (Vernon 
1995)). 
141. Sec Bittkcr, Regulation of Interstate and Foreign Commerce at* 6.06[AJ (cited 
in note 12). 
142. Dickerson, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 710. 
143. Id. at 706-07. The judge seemed to find no inconsistency between his applica-
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stress on language from Hostetter and Midcal Aluminum, and 
understood cases like Bacchus Imports to have grafted an "eco-
nomic ,grotectionism" exception onto the Twenty-first Amend-
ment.1 
In a similar case proceeding through a federal district court 
in New York, a judge recently dismissed the State's motion to 
dismiss a challenge to New York's direct shipment and advertis-
ing ban. 145 Citing the "evolution in Twenty-first Amendment ju-
risprudence" since 1970 when the state statute withstood a simi-
lar challenge, the district court felt that "it would be 
inappropriate" to deny plaintiffs the opportunity to present evi-
dence in support of their claims that the statute violated the 
Commerce Clause.1"6 Again, Midcal Aluminum and Bacchus 
Lion of a "per sc rule of invalidity" and his description of recent Twenty-first Amendment 
cases as requiring a "balancing approach." 
144. Sec id. at 705 (citing Hosteuer's statement that it was "patently absurd" to argue 
that the Amendment n:pealcd the Commerce Clause); id. at 706 (citing Midcal for the 
proposition that "the relationship and effect on each other of federal and state interests" 
had to be weighed; that "there is no bright line between federal and state powers over 
liquor"; and Hosteuer's language that since both the Amendment and the Commerce 
Clause were parts of the same Constitution, each needed to be considered in light of the 
other), 707 (citing Bacchus Imports for the proposition that courts "have increasingly 
emphasized federal intcn;sts and more carefully scrutinized the actual purpose behind 
the state's law'' as opposed to deferring "to the amendment's express grant of virtually 
complete control to the states over importation and sale of liquor and structuring of a 
liquor distribution system within their own borders"). 
Following Judge Easterbrook's decision in Bridenbaugh, the district judge in 
Dickerson reconsidered the initial grant of summary judgment for the plaintiff, but af-
firmed the initial grant of the plaintiff's motion. Dickerson, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 694-95. 
The court reviewed the recent cases, considered Judge Easterbrook's decision, and con-
cluded that the recent deciswns of the Supreme Court and binding precedent in the Fifth 
Circuit compelled its decision. ld. at 692-93. The Fifth Circuit decision cited by the court 
was Cooper \'. McBeath, II F.3d 547 (5th Cir. 1994), in which the court struck down a 
Texas law requiring a three-year durational residency requirement as a precondition for 
obtaining a liquor permit under the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. The Fifth Cir-
cuit repeated the usual statements from Hosteller and Bacchus about the Twenty-first 
Amendment not protecting economic protectionism, and the need to reconcile the 
Commerce Clause with the Twenty-first Amendment. One might distinguish the situa-
tion in Cooper from that in Dickerson on the ground that the grant or denial of liquor 
permits is not closely related to the regulation of the importation of liquor for delivery or 
usc in a state. Sec also Glazer's Wholesale Drug Co., Inc. v. Kansas, 145 F. Supp. 2d 
1234, 1246-47 (D. Kan. 2001) (striking down a ten-year residency requirement for ali-
cense to distribute liquor). 
145. Swedenburg v. Kelly, 200.) WL 1264285 (S.D.N.Y) (Sept. 5, 2000), at *1. The 
ban prohibited any advertisement or solicitation for sale of alcoholic beverages without 
being licensed by the state, as well as in-state shipment, by common carrier or otherwise, 
of alcoholic beverages other than to consignees licensed by the state. ld. (citing N.Y. Al-
cohol and Bev. Control Law§§ 102(1)(a), (c), and (d)). 
146. Id. at *7. The court "hasten[cd[ to add," in a footnote, that its denial of the mo-
tion to dismiss "is in no way [a] ruling ... upon the ultimate merits of the parties' respec-
tive claims." ld. at *7 n.l6. 
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Imports figured prominently in the court's conclusion that a 
jurisprudential "evolution" had taken place. 147 
Finally, there is Bridenbraugh v. O'Bannon, 148 which was 
the first case to strike down, on dormant Commerce Clause doc-
trine grounds. In Bridenbraugh, state law outlawed the ship-
ment of alcoholic beverages into the state to anyone except 
wholesalers, specifically including sales over the Internet. 149 In a 
brief opinion, the district judge dismissed the argument that the 
Twenty-first Amendment authorized Indiana's law. The court 
took "judicial notice of the historic setting of [the] Amendment" 
and asserted that "the second section of [the] Amendment had 
as its legislative purpose to permit states to regulate by local op-
tion, or indeed enforce statewide prohibition in regard to alco-
holic beverages." 150 But neither of those goals, the judge contin-
ued, had "any bearing whatsoever to this case." The judge 
instead applied a balancing test: "whether the interests impli-
cated by a state's regulation are so closely related to the powers 
reserved by the Amendment that the regulation may prevail, 
notwithstanding the fact that its requirements directly conflict 
with express federal policy. " 151 The only core principle pro-
tected by the Twenty-first Amendment is temperance, the judge 
concluded; because the Indiana statute facially discriminated 
against interstate commerce and was not obviouslr related to 
temperance, it had to yield to the Commerce Clause. )2 
147. Sec id. at *5, *6 & n.11. The district court recently granted summary judgment 
to the plaintiffs who challenged the New York laws, concluding that the "Defendants 
have not shown that New York's ban on the direct shipment of out-of-state wine, and 
particularly the in-state exceptions to the ban, implicate the State's core concerns [i.e., 
the promotion of temperance] under the Twenty-first Amendment." Swedenburg v. 
Kelly, 2002 WL 31521023, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
148. 78 F. Supp. 2d 828 (N.D. Ind. 1999), rev'd sub. nom., Bridenbaugh v. Freeman-
Wilson, 2lXJO WL 1286249 (7th Cir. 2lXJO). 
149. Bridenbaugh, 78 F. Supp. 2d at829 & n.2 (citing Ind. Stat.§ 7. 1-5-11-1.5). 
150. !d. at 831. The judge adduced no historical evidence to support what he as-
serted to be the clear purpose of* 2. Compare Part II. 
151. ld. 
152. !d. at 831-32. Other district court decisions follow the trend of the other district 
courts in striking down aspects of state liquor shipment laws. See Beskind v. Easley, 197 
F. Supp. 2d 464 (W.D.N.C. 2002); Bolick v. Roberts, 199 F. Supp. 2d 397 (E.D. Va. 2lXJ2); 
Glazer's Wholesale Drug Co., Inc. v. Kansas, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1234 (D. Kan. 2001 ). These 
cases held that the Twenty-first Amendment provides no shield to "protectionist" state 
laws imposing different requirements on in-state and out-of-state alcohol manufacturers. 
See Beskind, 197 F. Supp. 2d at 474 ("Economic protectionism is not the purpose of this 
safe harbor [i.e., the Twenty-first Amendment] from the Commerce Clause."); Bolick, 
199 F. Supp. 2d at 416-17 (accepting magistrate judge's finding that aspects of Virginia's 
alcohol control statutes were unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause doc-
trine, and that the Twenty-first Amendment provided no defense for the state). 
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All of the district court opinions share a common flaw: They 
give unduly broad readings to Supreme Court opinions that do 
not directly address issues of state regulation of importation of 
alcohol, then proceed to apply them to situations covered by the 
express language of the Amendment. For example, as uncon-
vincing as his distinction might have been, Justice Stewart took 
pains to characterize the arrangement in Hostetter as one not in-
volving "importation ... for delivery or use therein" to avoid fal-
ling squarely within the Amendment's language and the Court's 
own prior cases. 153 Similarly, Midcal Aluminum turned on 
whether California's discriminatory pricing scheme- as opposed 
to regulations of alcohol imports-was protected by the Twenty-
first Amendment. 154 Even Bacchus Imports involved a ques-
tion-whether Hawaii could offer a tax exemption to an other-
wise generally-applicable tax for locally-produced liquor-much 
different than those posed by the recent cases, which strike at 
the very heart of what Midcal and Capital Cities Cable did not 
presume to question: the power of states to structure their liquor 
importation systems. 
The confusion in the lower courts received a welcome cor-
rective when the Seventh Circuit unanimously overturned the 
district court's decision in Bridenbraugh. 155 Writing for the 
court, Judge Easterbrook recognized that "§ 2 of the twenty-first 
amendment empowers Indiana to control alcohol in ways that it 
cannot control cheese" under the dormant Commerce Clause 
doctrine. 156 Rejecting the "core purpose" argument adopted by 
the district courts, and relying on the text and history of the pro-
vision, Judge Easterbrook concluded that, after the ratification 
of the Twenty-first Amendment, "[n]o longer may the dormant 
commerce clause be read to protect interstate shipments of li~­
uor from regulation; § 2 speaks directly to these shipments."1 7 
Every such regulation, he noted, is "'discrimination' ... because 
every statute limiting importation leaves intrastate commerce 
unaffected." Were such regulation held to be outside the ambit 
153. Hostetter, 377 U.S. at 330. 
154. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. at 110 ("The Twenty-first Amendment grants the 
States virtually complete control over whether to permit importation or sale of liquor 
and how to structure the liquor distribution system."). 
155. Sec Bridenbraugh v. Freeman-Wilson, 2000 WL 1286249 (7th Cir.) (Sept. 13, 
2lXlO). 
156. !d. at *2. 
157. !d. at *5. 
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of the Amendment, he concluded, "§ 2 would be a dead let-
ter. ,Jss 
As for the Supreme Court's case law allegedly forbidding 
the sort of statute passed by Indiana, Judge Easterbrook cor-
rectly noted that "[n]o decision of the Supreme Court holds or 
implies that laws limited to the importation of liquor are prob-
lematic under the dormant commerce clause." He read subse-
quent cases as "apply[ing] an unconstitutional conditions ap-
proach to the use of§ 2 power," further explaining that "[w]hat 
the Court has held ... is that the greater power to forbid imports 
does not imply a lesser power to allow imports on discriminatory 
terms." 159 Thus, "unless the state has used its power to impose a 
discriminatory condition on importation, one that favors Indiana 
sources of alcoholic beverages over sources in other states, as 
Hawaii did in Bacchus," the Indiana law was constitutional. 160 
Because he could find no such discrimination and because, in his 
opinion, the Indiana statute was exactly the sort of law intended 
to be passed under Section Two's grant of power, the court up-
held the statute. 161 
158. Id. 
159. Id. But sec note 184. 
160. ld. 
161. ld. at *6. Subsequent district court opinions, however, have not followed Judge 
Easterbrook's analysis. Many courts accused Judge Easterbrook of ignoring "the last 
forty years of Supreme Court jurisprudence relating to balancing and harmonizing the 
dormant commerce clause and § 2 of the twenty-first amendment." Dickerson, 212 F. 
Supp. 2d at 682; sec also Bolick, 199 F. Supp. 2d at 434 ("To accept the Bridenbaugh 
court's decision as dispositive would require explicit rejection of the applicability of the 
dormant Commerce Clause .... That conclusion is unacceptable in light of the Supreme 
Court's decisions resolving the conflict between the Twenty-first Amendment and the 
rest of the Constitution.") (footnote omitted). Other courts noted the difference be-
tween the law at issue in their cases, and the Indiana direct shipment law, which Judge 
Easterbrook held to apply equally to in-state and out-of-state shippers. Sec Swedenburg, 
2002 WL 3152103, at *7 ("That the New York direct shipping ban on out-of-state wine 
... is discriminatory (on its face) is clear from the very wording ... of the exemptions 
favoring in-state wineries.") (footnote omitted); Beskind, 197 F. Supp. 2d at 475 
("[UJnlike the Seventh Circuit, this Court is faced with a statutory scheme that clearly 
favors North Carolina sources of alcoholic beverages over sources in other states.") (em-
phasis added). But sec Heald v. Engler, (No. CJU.A 00-CV-71438) 2001 U.S. Dis!. 
LEXJS 24825 at *10 (E. D. Mich.) (Sept. 28, 2001) (upholding a Michigan direct shipment 
law that exempted in-state producers). 
In the only other case to reach the Court of Appeals, the Eleventh Circuit recently 
vacated a Florida district court decision upholding that state's direct shipment laws 
(which contain an in-state exemption), remanding the case for evidence regarding the 
purpose served by the statutory scheme. Bainbridge v. Turner, 311 F.3d 1104, 1106 (11th 
Cir. 2002). "If the subject of Florida's regulatory scheme were an ordinary widget (rather 
than liquor)," Judge Tjollat wrote, "the statutes would violate the Commerce Clause. 
But if the State demonstrates that its statutory scheme is closely related to a core concern 
of the Twenty-first Amendment and not a pretext for mere protectionism, Florida's stat-
utes can be upheld." Jd. While noting that the Supreme Court had not been particularly 
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V. A SUGGESTED APPROACH FOR FUTURE CASES 
As Judge Easterbrook's opinion for the Seventh Circuit 
demonstrates, all is not lost. There is still hope for reviving the 
moribund Twenty-first Amendment; perhaps the spate of recent 
litigation over Internet alcohol sales will provide the tonic 
needed to arrest its complete demise. In this last section, I will 
put forth some principles that courts should employ when hear-
ing cases involving dormant Commerce Clause challenges to 
state alcohol regulations-principles that follow directly from 
the history of the Twenty-first Amendment and the subsequent 
cases discussed above. Most of what follows seeks, as its in-
tended audience, a hearing from the lower courts, although there 
may also be hope at the Supreme Court level. 162 Accordingly, I 
also have some suggestions for the Court. 
A. LOWER COURTS 
1. Remember the Text and Purpose of the Twenty-first 
Amendment-Despite recent suggestions that only temperance, 
or some similar police power aim, can justify treating alcohol dif-
ferently from other consumer articles under the dormant Com-
merce Clause doctrine,163 the history of the Twenty-first 
Amendment, particularly the controversy over the original "sa-
loon" section and its eventual rejection, and the text of Section 
Two make clear that the Amendment was about states receiving 
helpful on this question, it seemed to accept that the universe of the Twenty-first 
Amendment's "core concern[s]" was not exhausted by temperance. !d. at 1114-15. The 
court also noted that a state's scheme could be discriminatory without constituting "mere 
protectionism." !d. at 1113. One judge on the panel dissented, and would have upheld 
the district court's decision upholding the laws. !d. at 1116 (Roney, C.J., dissenting). 
Bainbridge, too, declined to follow Judge Easterbrook's analysis in Bridenbaugh. Id. at 
1114 n.15 ("We disagree with the analytical framework used in that case and arc skepti-
cal of its assessment of the facts."). 
162. It is worth noting that, at present, three present members or the Court-Chid 
Justice Rehnquist, and Justices O'Connor and Stevens-have been among the most vocal 
critics of the Court's Twenty-first Amendment decisions. Sec Healy, 491 U.S. at 345, 349 
(Rehnquist, C.J., Stevens and O'Connor, JJ., dissenting) ("by reason of the Twenty-first 
Amendment the States possess greater authority to regulate commerce in beer than they 
do commerce in milk''; acknowledging power that Twenty-first Amendment gives states 
over alcohol imports and alcohol distribution structure); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp., 
476 U.S. at 586, 590-91 (Stevens, White and Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting) (arguing that 
greater power of exclusion from state includes lesser power to impose conditions on sale, 
including power to require in-state sale prices be keyed to sale prices in other states); 
Bacchus Imports, Ltd., 468 U.S. at 278, 279 (Stevens, Rehnquist and O'Connor, JJ., dis-
senting) ("I would affirm the judgment of the Supreme Court of Hawaii because the 
wholesalers' Commerce Clause claim is squarely foreclosed by the Twenty-first Amend-
ment to the Constitution of the United States."). 
163. Sec, e.g., Shanker, 85 Va. L. Rev. at 383 (cited in note 3). 
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constitutional assurance of their power over the alcohol trade. 
Without Section Two, the states had no assurance against repeal 
of legislation like the Webb-Kenyon Act; and a change in per-
sonnel on the Supreme Court could have returned them to the 
days when the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine was em-
ployed to frustrate efforts to control alcohol importation. From 
this, a second point naturally follows. 
2. State Alcohol Regulations Should Come to Court with a 
Presumption of Validity- There is a certain irony that in the 
midst of the most vigorous judicial enforcement of federalism in 
over sixty years, a specific textual reservation of power to states 
has been eroded almost to the point of irrelevance. Even if the 
"new" New Federalism is not her cup of tea, respect for the text 
of the Twenty-first Amendment and its history ought to compel 
a judge to presume the validity of state alcohol regulations-
especially those that regulate the importation or transportation 
of alcohol into or through the state-regardless whether those 
regulations make doing business more expensive for retailers or 
consumers, or whether the regulations seem quaint or paternalis-
tic. This presumption, of course, is not irrebuttable. As Judge 
Easterbrook suggests in his opinion, and as the Court itself has 
made clear, there are some limits to the state's power. While 
there is ample evidence that the framers and ratifiers of the 
Twenty-first Amendment sought freedom from the restraints of 
the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, there is nothing to sug-
gest that state alcohol regulators are to be free of the Due Proc-
ess Clause164 or the First Amendment. 165 Nor should the 
Amendment permit one state to control the liquor trade within 
its borders by reaching into other jurisdictions to regulate the 
liquor trade in that state. 166 The core power is the power to con-
trol the importation of alcoholic beverages for delivery or use 
within the state, and those ancillary powers that are necessary to 
effectuate that core power. 167 
3. Do Not Construe Supreme Court Cases in This Area 
Broadly-The lower courts in recent alcohol cases insist on ex-
tracting broad principles from the Supreme Court cases, without 
164. Sec note 116. 
165. Sec note 116. 
166. Sec note 115. 
167. Thus, states ought to be given lccwa) m n:gulatmg through-shipments Sec 
notes 66-75 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's treatment of early through-
shipment cases) Like Justices Frankfurter and Jackson, I would lind this power to regu-
late through-shipments In the penumbra of the Twcnty-Jirst Amendment, mst<.:ad oJ al-
lowing it as a matter of judicial grace, and only if "reasonable." 
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sufficient attention to relevant facts that should counsel a nar-
rower reading. Worse are the decisions that quote portions of 
Court opinions (especially those portions stressing the need to 
harmonize the Commerce Clause and the Twenty-first Amend-
ment, or that claim that it is folly to presume the Amendment 
"repealed" the Commerce Clause) and treat those as the propo-
sition for which the cases stand. 168 The Supreme Court cases 
from which the choicest quotations are taken- Hostetter, Midcal 
Aluminum, Bacchus Imports, and the like-are factually distin-
guishable from the recent alcohol cases concerning Internet sales 
and direct shipment bans. 169 Lower courts should recognize that 
whatever state regulations the Court has stuck down, it has al-
ways been careful to preserve the state's power to regulate alco-
hol imported into the state for delivery or use. The Court's lan-
guage on this point has been quite unambiguous. 170 This 
insensitivity to the factual context in which other cases arose, I 
think stems from two related misunderstandings. 
4. Do Not Misrake "Regulation" of Imports for Impermissi-
ble "Discrimination.,- The text of the Twenty-first Amendment 
clearly entitles states to regulate importations into the state; no 
Supreme Court case suggests otherwise. To claim, as recent 
court decisions have, that requiring importers of alcohol to ob-
tain a license from the state constitutes facial discrimination for-
bidden by the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine is absurd. 
The differential treatment (imported alcohol versus domestically 
produced alcohol, or out-of-state importers versus in-state re-
tailers) is authorized by the Amendment itself. Benefits flowing 
to intrastate distributors, retailers, brewers, or distillers are a 
natural byproduct of the state's exercise of its constitutionally-
granted power. 
5. Do Not Allow Internet Commerce Elements to Confuse 
the Issue- While the advent of the Internet and electronic com-
merce has convinced some that old rules do not apply, others 
have cautioned that we should not get too carried away; that the 
old rules do still have some application. 171 When older cases in-
volved illegal importation of liquor into states in the back of a 
truck or a car, 172 or, say, the transportation of several hundred 
168. Sec notes 139-154 and accompanying text. 
169. Sec notes 153-154 and accompanying text. 
170. Sec notes 113, 122 & 130 and accompanying text. 
171. Sec, e.g., Jack L. Goldsmith and Alan 0. Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant 
Commerce Clause, 110 Yale L.J. 785 (2001 ). 
172. Sec, e.g., Atkins v. Manning, 56 S.E.2d 260, 262 (Ga. 1949) (upholding condcm-
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cases of Coors beer from Texarkana, Texas to Atlanta, Geor-
gia,173 there was no question that the state had the power to 
prosecute violations of its laws. That more recent cases involve 
epicures importing fine wines ordered over the Internet, rather 
than Big and Little Enos Burdette hiring the Bandit and the 
Snowman to fetch their beer,174 should not make one iota of dif-
ference in a court's analysis. 
B. SUPREME COURT 
1. Acknowledge Accessibility and Reliability of Intent of 
Twenty-first Amendment-The Twenty-first Amendment was 
debated and ratified in the early 1930s. Relevant materials de-
scribing positions of supporters and opponents, as well as the 
perceptions of those who were to ratify the Amendment, 
abound. 175 Yet, in several key Supreme Court opinions (not co-
incidentally those in which the Court was curbing the power of 
the states) Justices have gone out of their wa~ to claim that the 
intent is "confused" or that it does not exist. 76 Freed from in-
convenient facts, the Court is then able to substitute its own 
preferences for those of the Amendment's framers and ratifiers. 
If the Court cannot even discern what an amendment passed just 
sixty-odd years ago was supposed to accomplish, then one would 
expect to see a complete abandonment of all attempts to inform 
constitutional interpretation through the use of history. Since 
this obviously has not happened in recent years, the question 
then becomes why has the Twenty-first Amendment been 
treated any differently than other amendments? As I showed in 
an earlier section, the lack of clarity in the materials surrounding 
the ratification of the Amendment cannot suffice as a reason. 
2. Clarify Status ofYoung's Market Cases-Even if doubts 
remained about the precise intent of the framers and ratifiers of 
nation of truck used in illegal transportation of liquor from South Carolina; rejecting 
Commerce Clause challenge to condemnation: "the Twenty-first Amendment removes 
spiritous liquors and alcohol from the protections of the commerce clause to the extent 
necessary to allow the States to adopt and enforce appropriate laws and regulations deal-
ing with the subject, and thus to burden interstate commerce to this extent"); sec also 
Welborn v. Morely, 243 S.W.2d 635, 636-37 (Ark. 1951) (upholding confiscation of liquor 
transported illegally into state during journey from Louisiana to Kansas); State v. Gold-
berg, 166 P.2d 664, 180-81 (Kan. 1946) (upholding forfeiture for transportation of intoxi-
cating beverages in violation of state law). 
173. Sec Smokey and the Bandit (Universal Pictures 1977). 
174. See id. 
175. Sec Part II. 
176. See notes 135-136 and accompanying text. 
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the Twenty-first Amendment, the early case law could not have 
been more clear. When it came to importation for delivery or 
use, neither the Commerce Clause nor the Equal Protection 
Clause applied. When it came to through-shipment or regula-
tion of exports, great deference was accorded state regulations. 
The Young's Market line of cases was so clear, in fact, that sub-
sequent Courts (beginning with Hostetter) either had to twist 
facts to escape the gravitational pull of those cases (Justice 
Stewart's approach); simply to ignore them, relying on unsup-
ported claims that the original intent commanded a different re-
sult (Justice White's approach); or conclude that there were in-
terests that outweighed enforcement of the Amendment (Justice 
Powell's approach). This transformation of the Twenty-first 
Amendment jurisprudence from one of rules to one of standards 
has, in effect, overruled the Young's Market line of cases, but 
without the Court acknowledging responsibility for having done 
so. Should the Court accept one of these alcohol cases for re-
view, it should take the opportunity to do some doctrinal prun-
ing. If it is too late to return to the days of Young's Market, so 
be it; but the removal of doubt will greatly benefit both lawmak-
ers and lower court judges. 
3. Clearly Endorse Constitutional Power of States to Enforce 
Control over Importation for Delivery or Use-Assuming that 
the Court might be unlikely to regard the Young's Market line of 
cases as its touchstone for interpreting the Twenty-first Amend-
ment, the Court could still affirm the considerable power of the 
states over liquor merely by enforcing the text of the Amend-
ment. Not until Bacchus Imports did the Court strike down an 
exercise of state power over liquor imports; 177 on the contrary, 
earlier decisions affirmed that control over importation and liq-
uor distribution-not merely an interest in promoting temper-
ance, as Justice White suggested-were the core powers granted 
by the Amendment. This would mean, at a minimum, that the 
sorts of liquor licencing laws now being challenged would with-
stand scrutiny. Far from violating the Constitution, the state 
would merely be exercising the very power given to it by the 
177. While Hostetler struck down New York's regulation of Idlewild's operation, it 
did so by asserting that the alcohol was not actually imported into the state for delivery 
or usc in New York. In James B. Beam Distilling Co., the invalidation of Kentucky's tax 
was on the ground that it offended the prohibitions of the Import-Export Clause, whose 
limitations Justice Stewart claimed were left in tact by the Amendment. Sec notes 76-112 
and accompanying text. 
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Twenty-first Amendment, as the framers of that Amendment in-
tended. 
4. Overrule James B. Beam Distilling and Bacchus Imports 
-Some might object to strict application of the text on the 
ground that it could open the door to state suppression of, say, 
First Amendment freedoms under the guise of alcohol regula-
tions.178 But applying the text of the Amendment does not mean 
completely ignoring the primary purpose of the Amendment: to 
enable the states to control the liquor trade in their states, 
whether it involves domestic producers or importations from 
out-of-state, the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine notwith-
standing. That purpose is not implicated when a state alcohol 
regulation, even one concerning imports, offends one of the pro-
visions of the Bill of Rights, or the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 179 However, a textual application of 
the Amendment, with its purpose in mind, does suggest that 
some of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence is simply wrong, and 
should be overruled. I suggest that the Court, should the oppor-
tunity arise, overrule James B. Beam Distillers and Bacchus Im-
ports. 
Even proponents of what one commentator called the 
Court's "strangulation" 180 of the Twenty-first Amendment rec-
ognize the weakness of Justice Stewart's rationale for holdinfi 
that states may not regulate the importation of foreign liquor. 1 
No evidence from the framing or ratification of the Amendment 
suggests that foreign liquor was to be given some sort of privi-
leged position. And the text of the Amendment certainly sug-
gests that no such distinction was contemplated. 
The text of the Amendment also offers no support for Jus-
tice White's bald assertion, made in Bacchus Imports, that what-
ever the framers and ratifiers had in mind, they did not intend to 
authorize states to engage in economic protectionism. In fact, in 
the months immediately after the ratification, state legislatures 
hurried to draft statutes exempting imported liquors from cer-
tain taxes and regulations, if their liquor was offered reciprocal 
exemptions by other states. 182 Along with at least one statement 
178. Sec note 116. 
179. Sec note 116. 
180. Sec Spaeth, 79 Cal. L. Rev. at 163 (cited in note 66) (characterizing recent deci-
sions as having '·strangled much of the vitality from the twenty-first amendment''). 
181. Sec note 107 and accompanying text. 
182. Sec Wis..:r and Arledge, 7 Gco. Wash. L. Rev. at 403 (cited in note 27) ("As 
though in anticipation of the Supreme Court's broad interpretation of the grant of power 
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made by a member of Congress opposing Section Two of the 
Amendment because of the possibility states would abuse their 
183 h . . 1 f" h h power - t ese reciprocity aws con Irm w at t e text suggests, 
viz., that there was no distinction made between "good" regula-
tions of imports and "bad" ones. 184 
in the Twenty-first Amendment, some states had feared economic discrimination by 
other states against their liquor products and several ... del!mcd it nccl!ssary to establish 
by statute what ... amount to reciprocal trade agreements."). The authors ignore what 
seems to bl! an equally plausible interpretation of lhl! states' actions: that the possibility 
of resultant discrimination against out-of-state liquor was seen as a possible byproduct of 
Section Two's grant of power. This cvidencl! of the states' understanding of the scope of 
the Amendment, moreover, contradicts a earlier statement in the same article that "[t]he 
second section of the Amendment generally was thought of as ... assurancl! that dry 
states would be protected from an influx of imported liquor" as opposed to authorizing 
'"state tariff laws." Id. at402. 
183. Sec note 49 and accompanying text. 
184. In his Bridenbaugh opinion, J udgc Easterbrook suggested that the Supreme 
Court, in some recent Twenty-first Amendment cases like Bacchus Imports, had been 
applying the "unconstitutional conditions" doctrine: states may prohibit the importation 
of liquor altogether, but if it chooses to allow importation, it may not condition the abil-
ity to import on the payment of discriminatory taxes or the submission to discriminatory 
or protectionist regulations. Sec Bridenbaugh, 2000 WL at *5. Since Judge Easterbrook 
found no such discrimination in the statute, other than that authorized by § 2's grant of 
power, he upheld the Indiana regulatory scheme. Sec id 
While the unconstitutional conditions doctrine may furnish an l!xplanation for cases 
like Constantineau and 44 Liquormart, where the First Amendml!nt and the right to due 
process arc implicated, I think that it is inapplicable to cases like Bacchus Imports, in 
which locally-produced liquor was exemptl!d from an otherwise generally-applicable ex-
cise tax. 
In her seminal article on the subject, Kathleen Sullivan ddined thl! unconstitutional 
c<Jnditions doctrine as holding "that government may not grant a benefit on the condition 
that the beneficiary surrender a constitutional right, even if the government may with-
hold that benefit altogether. It reflects the triumph of the view that government may not 
do indirectly what it may not do directly" under a greater-includes-the-lesser view of 
governmental power. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1413, 1415 (1989). In the context of the Twenty-first Amendment, then, Constan-
tineau and 44 Liquormart arc correct: just because the state may prohibit alcohol alto-
gether, it docs not follow that it has carte blanche to extort waivers of constitutional 
rights as a condition of allowing its sale or purchase. 
However, the application of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to situations in 
which the state is allegedly engaging in discriminatory or protectionist regulation of out-
of-state liquor is more problematic. The right of an out-of-state commercial actor to be 
free from discriminatory treatment at the hands of state governments derives from the 
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment was un-
derstood to disable the dormant Commerce Clause as it applied to liquor-thus remov-
ing the "right" to import liquor free of stall! discrimination. Therefore, it seems that by 
allowing liquor to be imported, but subjecting it to discriminatory regulations not im-
posed on domestically-produced liquor, the state is not attempting to "do indirectly what 
it may not do directly"; rather, it is exercising the very power granted to It under the 
Twenty-first Amendment. 
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CONCLUSION 
Recent lower court cases invalidating longstanding state al-
cohol regulations seem to have fallen under the spell of the 
Internet, and assume that "e-commerce must be free!" But as 
more courts have succumbed to the siren song of cyberspace, 
they have in the process ignored constitutional text, evinced in-
difference to the history of the Twenty-first Amendment, and 
misapplied Supreme Court precedent. They have, in fact, come 
close to effecting a virtual repeal of the Amendment. But there 
is opportunity in this new wave of litigation, the opportunity to 
repair the erosion of state power under the Amendment caused 
by years of parsimonious interpretation by the U.S. Supreme 
Court. By keeping the text and the history of the Amendment 
squarely in view, courts can not only restore a measure of state 
power, but also protect the integrity of the amending process, as 
well. 
In response to judicial restrictions on state regulation of the 
interstate alcohol trade, Congress passed a series of statutes 
granting such regulatory power to the states, the restrictions of 
the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine notwithstanding. These 
congressional efforts culminated in the ratification of the Eight-
eenth Amendment, which inaugurated a fourteen year experi-
ment with national prohibition. When the decision was made to 
end the experiment, state concerns about their ability to control 
the alcohol trade reemerged. The history of the Twenty-first 
Amendment's drafting demonstrates that its provisions were de-
signed to allay those concerns by constitutionalizing state control 
over alcohol imported into states. Proponents and opponents of 
repeal both agreed that the power rightly belonged to the states, 
and were careful to eliminate the possibility of federal en-
croachment upon that power by eliminating the "concurrent 
power" provision, which would have empowered both the fed-
eral and state governments to regulate the saloon. 
With that important change, what became the Twenty-first 
Amendment was sent to the states for ratification. The "drys" 
were assured that the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine 
would not be revived to strike down state regulatory efforts; the 
"wets," too, were provided with constitutional assurances that 
dry forces could not use a concurrent power provision to rees-
tablish some form of federal prohibition in the future. As the 
participants understood it, the main question regarding alcohol 
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regulation was one of power. The Twenty-first Amendment set-
tled it in favor of the states. 
Early Supreme Court cases clearly reflected that under-
standing, refusing to rewrite the Amendment under the guise of 
interpreting it, even when the Court was presented with dis-
criminatory state regulatory regimes. Since the mid-1960s, how-
ever, the Supreme Court has consistently made inroads on the 
power reserved to the states by the Amendment. Finally, in 
1984, the Court signaled an intent to apply to state alcohol regu-
lations the very dormant Commerce Clause analysis that the 
Amendment was intended to foreclose. At no time, moreover, 
has the Court made a convincing case for the correctness of its 
more recent decisions, as compared with its earlier decisions de-
clining to supervise state control of alcohol. Recent lower court 
decisions have continued the virtual repeal of the Twenty-first 
Amendment by broadly construing the Supreme Court's restric-
tive cases, while ignoring important factual differences between 
those cases and the recent cases involving direct shipment bans 
that would prohibit, for example, Internet alcohol sales. If the 
trend continues, the Amendment will become a dead letter. 
Were the matter of the Twenty-first Amendment simply 
one of cheap versus expensive liquor, or whether states ought to 
protect local interests as a matter of policy, I might applaud the 
actions of the Court. After all, the dormant Commerce Clause 
doctrine is a powerful judicial weapon designed to enforce the 
"common market" vision of the Framers-and so much the bet-
ter for the Nation. But, as is so often the case when means are 
subordinated to ends in fashioning constitutional law, there are 
real costs to the approach the Court ultimately chose to take. 
Perhaps the most serious cost of judicial abnegation of the 
Twenty-first Amendment is to the integrity of the amending 
process itself. As Laurence Tribe has noted, "[t]he resort to 
amendment-to constitutional politics as opposed to constitu-
tional law-should be taken as a sign that the legal system has 
come to a point of discontinuity, a point at which something ... 
distinctly more radical than ordinary legal evolution is called 
for." 185 If members of Congress who propose amendments, and 
those in the states who are called upon to ratify them cannot be 
assured that the judiciary will respect the "constitutional poli-
tics" of the amendment when interpreting it, then one might for-
185. Laurence H. Tribe, A Constitution We Are Amending: In Defense of a Re-
strained Judicial Role, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 433,436 (1983). 
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give them for asking whether it is worth going to the trouble of 
proposing Article V amendments at all. Such treatment might 
also signal to the judiciary that amendments need not be taken 
seriously. 186 Thus does the alleged lack of importance of the Ar-
ticle V amending process become a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
Not only would the denigration of our amending process (so 
important to the Framers 187) be a loss for our constitutional re-
gime, but it might have more ominous consequences for consti-
tutionalism in general. For if the judiciary is not bound to re-
spect the words and intent animating a relatively young 
amendment, then why should the Constitution's other, older tex-
tual boundaries command observance? The written nature of 
the Constitution was cited by Chief Justice John Marshall as one 
of the primary justifications for placing in the courts the power 
to review congressional acts for constitutionality. 188 Unfortu-
nately, even in this age when, to paraphrase Thomas Jefferson, 
"we are all textualists, we are all originalists," the history of the 
Twenty-first Amendment shows that some members of the judi-
ciary regard parts of the Constitution as less important than oth-
ers. Thus, when contemplating the fate of the Twenty-first 
Amendment, it hardly seems alarmist to wonder whether other 
parts of the Constitution are similarly vulnerable. 
186. This is what seems to have happened to the Twenty-seventh Amendment, U.S. 
Const. amend. XXVII ("No law, varying the compensation for the services of the Sena-
tors and Representatives, shall take effect, until an election of Representatives shall have 
intervened."). Sec Brannon P. Denning and John R. Vile, Necromancing the Equal 
Rights Amendment, 17 Const. Comm. 5l!3, 5l!8-l!l) (2000) (describing subsequent judicial 
treatments of the Twenty-seventh Amendment). For an argument that constitutional 
amendment arc not, in fact, important, sec David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitu-
tional Amendments, 114 Harv. L Rev. 1457 (20(Jl ). But sec Brannon P. Denning and 
John R. Vile, The Relevance of Constitlllional Amendments: A Reply to David Strauss, 77 
Tul. L Rev. 247 (2002). 
187. Sec, e.g., Brannon P. Denning, Means 10 Amend: Theories of Constitutional 
Change, 65 Tenn. L. Rev. 155, 162 (llili7) (noting that the delegates to the Philadelphia 
Convention unanimously approved a resolution calling for the inclusion of a provision 
allowing for amendment). 
188. Sec Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 176 (1803) (writing that under 
our Constitution, '·ft)hc powers of the legislature arc defined and limited; and that those 
limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written. To what purpose arc 
powers hmitcd, and ... that limitation committed to writing, if these limits may, at any 
time, be passed by those intended to be rctrained'1") A constitution, he continued "is 
either a superior paramount law ... or it is on a level with ordinary acts." Id. ' 
